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DEMOCRACY AS MEANINGFUL 
CONVERSATION 
Robert W. Bennett* 
I 
Much discussion of democracy in the United States, popular 
as well as scholarly, employs simple, descriptive models of that 
democracy. The most commonly encountered of these is what I 
call the "vote-centered" model of democracy. Under this vote-
centered model the public policy outcomes produced by legisla-
tures are traceable to equally weighted voter inputs. Another 
model that makes frequent appearance in the literature about 
democracy is an "interest group" model, under which demo-
cratic outcomes are depicted as "equilibrium" states in struggles 
among competing powerful, organized groups. For a variety of 
reasons, I do not think that either of these models' does a very 
satisfactory job of integrating the phenomena of American de-
mocracy. I will have something to say later about the interest 
group model, but the deficiencies in the dominant vote-centered 
model are particularly glaring and, because of its dominance, 
particularly important. The vote-centered model will be my 
principal foil in this Comment, as I advance another possibility, 
what I call "democracy as meaningful conversation," under 
which the citizenry is engaged by ongoing public conversation 
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1. Democracy can be and has been modeled in a large variety of ways. See gen-
erally, David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford U. Press, 2d ed. 1996). I will men-
tion a few other models in passing, but my purpose is not to exhaustively catalogue the 
strengths and weaknesses of each extant model, but rather to criticize the dominant one 
and open up the power and possibilities of a new one. 
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about public policy, and it is this engagement that is the stabi-
lizing force in the system. 
The existing descriptive models are not typically referred to 
as "models." They are not in any sense formal models. Indeed, 
they are usually implicit in discussions of democracy, rather than 
explicit. Even if implicit, however, they are models in the sense 
that they encapsulate American democracy by reference to cer-
tain central features. And they are simple models by virtue of 
the fact that the features they employ are few in number. As 
these simple models are made explicit, certain difficulties in the 
modeling process come into focus that are probably best high-
lighted from the outset. 
Models can be descriptive or normative, or even both at 
once. While the line between the two is in principle tolerably 
clear, it is also difficult to heed. Descriptive models describe 
what is, frequently ascribing causal connections among parts of 
what is modeled, and even predicting results to be expected if 
changes are made.2 In contrast, normative models provide an 
ideal to be strived for, or perhaps only dreamt of, but that need 
not now exist, or even be attainable. Still, models advanced as 
description are often likely at least to insinuate normative judg-
ments. For all descriptive models are selective. They choose 
some features of the system they purport to model to the exclu-
sion of others. The simpler the model, the more selective it will 
be. And if what a model identifies as encapsulating the modeled 
system is seen as a desirable feature rather than an undesirable 
or a normatively neutral one, then the model perforce has a 
normative twist. 
Holding the line between descriptive and normative models 
is additionally complicated by the fact that models consciously 
designed as normative are seldom greatly divorced from the re-
ality they seek to instruct. If the distance is too great, the task of 
bridging it will likely seem too substantial to justify the bother. 
For this reason there will typically be a high degree of corre-
spondence between normative models and the portion of the 
real world in view, so that even normative models may easily be 
mistaken for description- by the consumers of commentary 
based on models, but also on occasion by the commentators. 
2. It is possible to have a descriptive model that carries no predictive implications, 
and also to have a model that predicts while not containing anything that might plausibly 
be called "description." Most descriptive models do, however, have pretensions of pre-
dictive power, and the model I propose is of that sort. 
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The difficulty of holding the line between description and 
prescription is especially acute when modeling democracy/ 
probably because the appeal of democracy in the modern day is 
at once so great and so badly in need of explanation. Whatever 
the reasons, the descriptive and the normative are thoroughly 
intermixed in existing uses of the vote-centered model. My 
criticisms will largely be on a descriptive plane, but it may occa-
sionally be that the criticisms unjustifiably mistake for descrip-
tion what was intended as prescription. And while the inspira-
tion for the conversational model is description, the prescriptive 
pull has proved irresistible for me as well. What democracy as 
meaningful conversation purports above all to describe and ex-
plain is stability in the system, which it traces to widespread 
conversational involvement of the citizenry. Stability is usually 
viewed as a desirable feature of political systems, especially 
when, as with the conversational model, it is not the product of 
coercion. For that reason I will often ascribe virtue to conversa-
tional phenomena. But I want to be clear that any normativity 
in the conversational model is decidedly limited. Stability is 
surely not the only, or even necessarily the highest, virtue in sys-
tems of government, nor do I claim that the conversational 
model identifies the only source of stability in democracies. 
Even on a descriptive level, simple models of complex 
things can easily mislead, for they will inevitably fail to account 
for a good deal of the complexity. For large scale social phe-
nomena like democracy in the United States, controlled experi-
mentation is unavailable, so that ascribing causal connections 
must always be done cautiously and tentatively. If two models 
describe and explain different things, moreover, there will be no 
common metric by which to judge one more "accurate" than the 
other, and also no objectively verifiable basis for saying that the 
one rather than the other has described the "right" thing. De-
spite these difficulties-or perhaps because of them-the more 
complex a phenomenon of interest, the more inevitable and use-
ful simple models will be. They break the complexity down into 
a more useable form, one that can facilitate understanding and 
discussion. In such a setting the appeal of a model will neces-
sarily rest not on some systematic basis for choice, but on in-
formed intuition about whether the model identifies important 
things and provides a measure of coherence in its account of di-
verse phenomena. It is on this basis that I believe that democ-
3. See Held, Models of Democracy at 8 (cited in note 1). 
484 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:481 
racy as meaningful conversation succeeds. The description it 
provides is by no means comprehensive, but the model does 
point the way to connections among important features of 
American democracy that the vote-centered model, its most 
prominent competitor, misses or muddles. 
I begin in Section II with some sounds of silence that got 
me thinking about deficiencies in the vote-centered model and 
about alternatives to it. I begin with the almost unquestioning 
acceptance of the apportionment of the United States Senate. 
II 
The absence of controversy over the apportionment of the 
Senate is striking. In the Great Compromise of 1787 that 
opened the way for agreement on the Constitution, the House of 
Representatives was apportioned among the states by popula-
tion (with the significant qualification that each state is entitled 
to at least one representative), while the Senate was appor-
tioned by states, with each entitled to two Senators. This equal 
Senate representation of the states is declared by the Constitu-
tion to be unalterable without a state's consent.4 The obvious 
consequence is that populous states have less representation per 
capita in the Senate than thinly populated ones (while citizens in 
territories and the District of Columbia have none at all). In 
1787 the disparity in population between the more and less 
populous states was already significane -that is what necessi-
tated the compromise-and it has grown over the years. Today 
the ten most populous states have more than fifty percent of the 
nation's population. California alone has more than sixty-five 
times the population of Wyominr, while each has the constitu-
tionally prescribed two Senators. Suggestions are occasionally 
4. U.S. Const., Art. V. 
5. In Federalist 22 Hamilton lamented the equal state suffrage in the unicameral 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation. He noted that a "majority of States ... 
[could comprise] a small minority of the people of America." Federalist 22 (Hamilton) 
in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 143, 146 (Mentor, 1961). In a footnote he 
calculated that at the time "New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the 
States, but they do not contain one third of the people." !d. 
6. See Robert Famighetti, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997, at 
384 (World Almanac Books, 1996) (relying on the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Depart· 
ment of Commerce, 1990 Census). According to the 1990 census, the ten least populous 
states-providing 20 percent of the total number of Senators-contain just over 3 per· 
cent of the nation's population. !d. For a discussion lamenting the situation on the basis 
of data from the 1980 census, see Peter Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional 
Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 409 (1987). 
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advanced with apparent seriousness that California be split into 
two states, but to the best of my knowledge the focus of concern 
is exclusively intrastate, asserted antagonisms or incompatibili-
ties of north and south, and not at all dissatisfaction with the 
state's apportionment in the United States Senate.7 
This seems all the more remarkable given the reapportion-
ment decisions of the United States Supreme Court, especially 
the 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims. 8 In Reynolds the Court 
decided that both houses of bicameral state legislatures were re-
quired to be apportioned by population. In doing so the Court 
was naturally called upon to explain how it was that the national 
legislature-most importantly the Senate-is not only allowed 
but required to deviate from that pattern. There is, of course, 
specific constitutional language governing the apportionment of 
the Senate, while the Constitution is basically silent on the struc-
ture of state government, save that the states are guaranteed a 
"Republican Form of Government"9 -the framers' term for 
what we would be more likely to call "representative democ-
racy."10 The Court based its decision not on that "guarantee," 
which had long been held non-justiciable, 11 but on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And the 
Court in Reynolds provided an explanation for the difference in 
constitutional treatment of the Congress and state legislatures 
that on its own terms seems persuasive enough: 
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Fed-
eral Congress is one ingrained in our Constitution ... con-
7. See Katherine Bishop, California Dreaming, 1991 Version: North Secedes and 
Forms 51st State, N.Y. Times, 7 (Nov. 30, 1991). Perhaps even more striking is the ap-
parent disinterest in the possibility suggested by a provision attendant to the annexation 
of Texas and its admission to the union as a state: "New States, of convenient size, not 
exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient 
population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory 
thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitu-
tion." Joint Resolution for Annexing Texas to the United States, 5 Stat. 797 (1845). (I 
am indebted to Vic Rosenblum for this reference.) For a few lonely (law professor) 
voices decrying senatorial representation based on states, see Akhil Reed Amar, Phila-
delphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. !043, 
1070-71 (1988); William N. Eskridge, The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 Const. 
Comm. 159 (1995); Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, 12 Const. Comm. 213 
(1995). 
5). 
8. 
9. 
10. 
377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 4. 
See, e.g., Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers at 77 (cited in note 
11. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849); see generally Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 217-25 (1962). 
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ceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the 
establishment of our federal republic. 
* * * 
Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities [on which 
legislative districts were often based], or whatever-never 
were and never have been considered as sovereign enti-
ties .... [T]hese governmental units are "created as conven-
ient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers 
of the State as may be entrusted to them," and the "number, 
nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] ... 
and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in 
the absolute discretion of the State." The relationship of the 
States to the Federal Government could hardly be less analo-
t2 go us. 
Persuasive as this distinction might be as a matter of law, it 
does not explain the absence of controversy surrounding the 
Senate. Indeed the Court's rationale for the basic holding of 
Reynolds compounds the puzzle. According to the Court, 
population-based apportionment of State legislatures- the 
Court's famous shorthand formula was "one man one vote" -is 
necessary to give each citizen an "equally effective voice in the 
election of members of his state legislature," as part of an 
"inalienable right to full and effective participation in the politi-
cal processes of his State's legislative bodies. "13 If "full and ef-
fective participation" requires population-based apportionment 
in the state context, however, no reason appears from what the 
Court had to say in Reynolds why the Senate apportionment 
would not be defective as well, in which case one would expect 
to see agitation about its apportionment, or at least some sub-
stantial sign of dissatisfaction, even supposing that the obstacles 
to constitutional change are insuperable. 14 Also striking is that 
12. 377 U.S. at 574-75. 
13. !d. at 565 (emphasis supplied). 
14. An argument could be made that, despite the attempted entrenchment of the 
equal Senate representation by Article V, representation could be changed without a 
State's consent by first amending Article V to eliminate the entrenchment and then 
amending the senatorial representation provision. See remarks of Senator Bigler, 
(quoted in Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 717, 729 n.67 (1981)). Whatever the theoretical or practical possibilities of such a 
two-step process (about both of which I am dubious), change with the consent of over-
represented states is in any event not foreclosed. As a practical matter the obstacles to 
splitting California into two states, which would yield doubled Senate representation for 
the people of the old California, are surely as great, yet that has not prevented the idea 
from gaining a degree of prominence. See text at note 7. 
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the Court's requirement of population-based apportionment for 
state legislatures has itself been relatively uncontroversial, even 
while coexisting in apparent ease with a Senate apportionment it 
seems-with its talk of "inalienable right"- to brand as in prin-
ciple foreign to the central tenets of American democracy. 
The more I puzzled about popular acceptance of a malap-
portioned Senate, the more it became clear to me that the no-
tion the Court articulated in Reynolds of what is central to de-
mocracy in the United States is pretty far off base. Many 
difficulties with what the Court had to say have been noted over 
the years. Thus, as public choice theorists repeatedly tell us, in 
itself the vote is a decidedly ineffective means by which an indi-
vidual citizen participates in politics. Demographic and other 
groupings of voters may tend to vote alike, and as groups they 
may prove decisive in candidate elections. The Court's empha-
sis in Reynolds, however, was on the individual's right, and in 
any reasonably populous district no individual voter has any sig-
nificant chance at all of having his vote determine the outcome 
of an election.15 In that sense, the vote of each individual was al-
ready (more or less) equally (in)effective in virtually all state 
electoral districts, essentially regardless of malapportionment. 
If the Court was really striving to equalize the degrees of 
(in)effectiveness of the individual's vote, moreover, it was on a 
fool's errand. In the tallying of votes in each district each per-
son's vote was already given the same weight. Each "person" 
(that is, "voter") already had "one vote." Beyond that, 
"effectiveness" of the vote as an instrument of electoral decision 
in the district or state {putting aside for the moment matters 
other than the vote that might make an individual citizen's voice 
"effective," or "participation" in legislative processes "full and 
effective") would be dependent on the distribution of politically 
salient sentiment. Holding size of the electorate constant, a vote 
in a district that is politically homogenous stands a much smaller 
chance of affecting the outcome in the district election than does 
a vote in a district where contending forces are about evenly 
balanced.16 And insofar as "effectiveness" in the state legisla-
15. One commentator estimates that an individual"s chance of having his vote de-
termine the outcome of an American presidential election is ''about [the] same order of 
magnitude as ... [the chance] of being killed driving to the polls."' Paul E. Miehl, The 
Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument, 71 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 11 
(1977); see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 244-47, 267 (Harper & 
Row, 1957); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 120-24 (Cambridge U. Press, 1979). 
16. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 204-05 (Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
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ture is associated with representation there of a voter's favored 
political party, nothing that happens in a district election mat-
ters one whit unless the state legislature comes to be close to 
equipoise in party representation. These matters the Court did 
not purport to address, and if it had attempted to do so, perhaps 
by requiring that each district reflect the political complexion of 
the state as a whole, it would have risked sinking the federal 
courts (and the country) in a quagmire of apportionment litiga-
tion. Being essentially powerless to produce either effectiveness 
or equal effectiveness of the individual's vote in candidate elec-
tions, what the Court did was impose a formal equality of indi-
vidual voting power in the state as a whole on top of the formal 
equal distribution of voting power in a district election that al-
d 0 d 17 rea y ex1ste . 
III 
As I got more deeply into these matters, increasingly it 
seemed that the conceptual problems with the Court's rationale 
in Reynolds run deep. The decision appears to be rooted in a 
traditional model of representative democracy in the United 
States that emphasizes the vote for representatives as its defin-
ing and dominating characteristic, as the essence of self-
government in ~mr "republican" form of government-a model I 
call "vote-centered." 
In this vote-centered model, there are two discrete stages 
by which important choices of public policy are made, first elec-
tion of representatives, and then public policy decisions by those 
representatives in the form of legislation. The electorate has its 
decisive say through the vote in the first stage. This vote in can-
didate elections is advanced as the mechanism within the model 
of popular sovereignty and self-governance, and it is associated 
with political equality through equal weighting of votes, and 
with majoritarianism, often taken to be a corollary of political 
equality. 18 Separately and together these elements are often ad-
17. In Section XI, I discuss an alternative rationale for the Court's decision in Rey· 
no ids. 
18. The connection is not a necessary one. Drawing straws with each person enti· 
tied to the same number of draws, or having certain things dealt with administratively 
without any vote at all, also treats each person "equally" (assuming in the latter case 
that the administrator is sufficiently under control, that he can be assumed to a mere 
functionary). So arguably does a supermajority requirement (say for constitutional 
amendments) where each voter is treated identically in determining whether the super-
majority requirement has been satisfied, or the common practice in the United States of 
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vanced in a normative spmt. Popular sovereignty, self-
governance, political equality, and majoritarianism are taken to 
be elements of what a political system should be. At the same 
time, however, they are taken to constitute a basically accurate 
description of contemporary American democracy. 
Under this model, the electorate's active role is largely 
completed in the first stage. Despite this, popular sovereignty, 
self-governance, political equality, and majoritarianism are as-
sumed to carry through descriptively to the second stage as well, 
to characterize the entire system and the decisions it reaches. If 
the people as a whole are "sovereign," and that sovereignty is 
distributed equally, then the legislative decisions are theirs too, 
and theirs equally, which means that each voter exercises an 
equal portion of influence in the eventual decisions of demo-
cratic government, those taken by the representative assembly. 
The mechanism by which this is accomplished under this 
vote-centered model is that the interests of the electorate are 
"re-presented" in the second stage by the representatives voted 
into office in the first. In this view representative democracy is 
adopted as an admittedly inferior substitute for bringing the en-
tire people together to make the decisions of government, as the 
only efficient way in a large scale democracy to provide sover-
eign decisions by the sovereign people. The accuracy of the re-
presentation of the interests of the electorate by representatives 
is aided by open competition among candidates in the candidate 
elections, so that the most faithful re-presenters are chosen. 
Free speech and free press are important then, and also between 
elections, to shore up the information base of the re-presenters 
about the interests of the electorate. Still, the process between 
elections is in the nature of things imperfect, because most peo-
ple remain silent then. It is the vote where virtually all adult 
citizens have the opportunity to speak, and it is the vote through 
which the sovereign people rule. Under the vote-centered 
model, the process is taken systematically to turn citizen prefer-
ences into "majoritarian" legislation. Votes are the crucial in-
puts in the vote-centered model, but much of the appeal of the 
model is in its depiction of public policy outputs as referable 
rather directly to equally weighted input of votes. Under the 
model citizen respect-and the stability it engenders-is gar-
allowing plurality decisions to govern in candidate elections with more than two candi-
dates. See text at notes 73-74. 
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nered because outputs are systematically related to inputs in this 
19 
way. 
I do not claim that any single theorist of American democ-
racy has explicitly embraced as descriptively accurate all the 
elements of such a vote-centered model.20 To the contrary, the 
19. While Madison, the most influential of the constitutional framers, did not usu-
ally talk in vote-centered terms, see text at note 44, other Federalists at the time did. 
Thus "Philanthrop'' to the Public wrote: "[A)re not the Congress and Senate servants of 
the people, chosen and instructed by them, because the whole body of the people cannot 
assemble at one place, to make and execute laws?" "Philanrhrop" to the Public in I The 
Debate on the Constitution 325 (Bailyn ed. 1993); see Max Farrand (ed.), 1 The Records 
of the Federal Convention of 1787 132 (Yale U. Press, 1986 revised ed.) ("The Govt. 
ought to possess ... the mind or sense of the people at large."); Farrand, IV Records, 
supra at 265 (''a representative body should serve as ... the most natural substitute for 
an assembly of the whole") (quoting John Adams); "An American Citizen" II, in I De-
bate, supra at 25, 27 ("the house of representatives-a body so pure in its election, so in-
timately connected by its interests and feelings, with the people at large .... "); 
"Americanus" III, in I Debate, supra at 437, 440 ("By this simple expedient [of represen-
tation] can the sense of the people of an extensive Empire be collected with ease and 
certainty"). Even Madison would on occasion use rhetoric with a vote-centered tinge 
when engaged in political debate, as he so often was. See, e.g., Federalist 52 (Madison) 
in The Federalist Papers 325 (cited in note 5); Federalist 54 (Madison) in The Federalist 
Papers 336 (cited in note 5); Federalist 57 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 350 (cited 
in note 5); Farrand, I Records 472 ("If the power is not immediately derived from the 
people, in proportion to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will 
be all"). In the ratification debates many antifederalist arguments can be seen as ex-
pressing doubt that vote-centeredness could be achieved in the "extended republic" of 
the United States. See generally, Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Rep-
resentation, and Party, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 12 (1989) ("Anti-Federalists regarded repre-
sentation as a second-best substitute for local self-government-a potentially dangerous 
attenuation of personal responsibility and assent. Their vision of representation would 
have required representatives to know and like their constituents, share in the commu-
nity's deliberations, and appreciate local opinions and feelings."). 
20. The constitutional framers besides Madison who are quoted in note 19 were 
essentially predicting that at least the House of Representatives would function after the 
fashion of the vote-centered model. With regard to moderns, the tendency to mingle the 
descriptive and the prescriptive makes it difficult to point to purely descriptive vote-
centered commentators. Robert Dahl, for instance, perhaps America's preeminent 
democratic theorist, seems pretty clearly to think that an ideal democracy would hark to 
vote-centeredness. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 97 (democracy 
associated with people governing themselves), 100 (democracy associated with equal 
weighting of interests), 109 (democracy associated with equal weighting of votes "[a]t 
the decisive stage of collective decisions"), 138 ("the strong principle of majority rule 
ensures that the greatest possible number of citizens will live under laws they have cho-
sen for themselves"), 144 (discussing a "utilitarian justification for majority rule"), 215 
("representation ... as an application of the logic of equality to a large-scale political 
system"), 322 (stressing importance of participation "in political life pretty much as 
equals") (Yale U. Press, 1989). On a descriptive level, however, Dahl coined the term 
"polyarchy" to describe a set of procedural characteristics focusing on electoral choice, 
id. at 221, and he insists that "so far no country has transcended polyarchy to a 'higher' 
stage of democracy." Jd. at 223. That would seem to exclude vote-centered outputs from 
any descriptive account of modern democracies, but Dahl also occasionally discusses 
contemporary electoral systems in terms of their realization of degrees of vote-centered 
outputs. See, e.g., id. at 149 (discussing virtues of systems of "proportional representa-
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problems with it are many and to a great extent both apparent 
and noted. 21 The vote-centered model is rather something that I 
have fleshed out from what others say. But something like such 
a model in both a normative and a descriptive mode seems to 
have a substantial hold on those who theorize about, and those 
who just seriously discuss, contemporary American democracy.22 
tion,"' see text at note 40, infra, as producing legislative majorities that replicate elec-
toral majorities and thus do not "weaken the translation of majority preferences into law 
and administration.") Dahl, supra at 149. Arend Lijphart sees Dahl's "polyarchies" 
(presumably including the United States) as "democratic regimes ... characterized not 
by perfect [vote-centered) responsiveness but by a high degree of it." Arend Lijphart, 
Democracies 2 (Yale U. Press, 1984). Among other commentators, Joseph M. Bessette, 
while insisting on the importance of deliberation in democracy, see text at notes 49-51, 
betrays a fixation with vote-centeredness: "The electoral connection is the chief mecha-
nism for ensuring ... a linkage between the values and goals of representatives and rep-
resented. If that linkage is sufficiently strong, then the policies fashioned by political 
leaders will effectively be those that the people themselves would have chosen had they 
possessed the same knowledge and experience as their representatives and devoted the 
same amount of time considering the information and arguments presented in the na-
tional councils." Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democ-
racy and American National Government 2 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994); see also Benja-
min I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy (U. of Chicago Press, 
1996). Thomas Christiano is a contemporary commentator who comes close to advanc-
ing a vote-centered model as what a "legitimate" democracy must be. See Thomas 
Christiano, Political Equality in Nomos XXXII at 151, Majorities and Minorities (John 
W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., New York U. Press, 1990). As sophisticated a 
commentator as Ronald Dworkin recently characterized Reynolds in the following way: 
'The Court ... struck down state schemes for drawing boundaries of electoral districts 
whose effect was to deny equal electoral impact, citizen by citizen, on a one-person one-
vote basis." Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. Rev. of Books 44, 47 
(Aug. 8, 1996) (emphasis supplied). 
21. See Section IV. 
22. Some prominent commentators take the vote-centered analysis a step further, 
insisting that the point of democracies, including the United States variant, is to effectu-
ate, or at least approximate, utilitarianism. See, e.g., Dahl, Critics at 143 (cited in note 
20); John Hart Ely, Constitutional lnterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 Ind. 
L.J. 399, 405-08 (1978); cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 276 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1977 ): 
Representative democracy [presumably absent court enforced constitutional 
rights) is widely thought to be the institutional structure most suited, in a com-
plex and diverse society, to the identification and achievement of utilitarian 
policies. It works imperfectly at this, for the familiar reason that majoritarian-
ism cannot sufficiently take account of the intensity, as distinct from the num-
ber, of particular preferences, and because techniques of political persuasion, 
backed by money, may corrupt the accuracy with which votes represent the 
preferences of those who have voted. Nevertheless democracy seems to en-
force utilitarianism more satisfactorily, in spite of these imperfections, than any 
alternative general political scheme would. 
See also, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The 
Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 
295, 298-99 (I 979). The idea is traced to Jeremy Bentham in Jeremy Waldron, Rights 
and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, in 20 Nomos XXXII at 44, 47-48 (cited in note 20). 
I am among those who have found the utilitarian description beguiling. See Robert W. 
Bennett, "Mere" Rationality In Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic 
Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049, 1062-69 (1979). Among the many brave assumptions 
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It is through use of such a vote-centered model, with its projec-
tion of the election stage ideology onto the system as a whole, 
that I am able to make some sense of the Court's quest for "full 
and effective participation" in "political processes of . . . [a] 
State's legislative bodies," under a banner of "one person one 
vote" in candidate elections. John Rawls also seems to be 
working basically within a vote-centered model when he de-
scribes a "principle of (equal) participation" requiring that "all 
citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to deter-
mine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes 
the laws with which they are to comply."23 Rawls' theory, like 
the Court's, has a normative thrust, but each must also think 
that its normative vision is within shooting distance of the way in 
which representative democracy actually operates. The spell of 
the vote-centered model as description is probably most appar-
ent in the repeated characterization of the American system of 
government and the results it reaches as "majoritarian."24 Leg-
required for the effectuation of utilitarianism by representative democracy would be 
that the legislature would somehow recreate in equal measures the desires not only of 
electoral majorities in their districts, but of the entire electorate, and then trade among 
them to achieve the maximum total satisfaction. While requiring additional assumptions 
beyond simple majoritarian decision making, the suggestion that democracy serves utili-
tarian ends also seems rooted in the vote-centered model, for it too assumes that the 
function of the representative assembly is to serve as a vehicle for transmitting voter 
sentiments into legislation, and to do so with a form of equal treatment. See generally, 
Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives 67,261 n.40 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994). 
23. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 221 (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 
1971 ); see Frederick Rosen, Majorities and Minorities: A Classical Utilitarian View in 
Nomos XXXII at 24, 32 (cited in note 20). There is a measure of ambiguity when Rawls 
uses the term ··right"' to denote what is held equally, rather than contribution to out-
comes, but he does seem to have actual effect on outcomes in mind as at least one thing 
that is to be distributed equally. He says, for instance, "[t]he liberties protected by the 
principle of participation lose much of their value whenever those who have greater pri-
vate means are permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public debate. 
For eventually these inequalities will enable those better situated to exercise a larger 
influence over the development of legislation." I d. at 225. 
24. Both the Court and a broad spectrum of commentators describe the American 
system in this way. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 139-41 (Free 
Press, 1990); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 40 (Cambridge 
U. Press, 1982); Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Man-
agement 191 (Harvard U. Press, 1995); Eskridge, 12 Const. Comm. at 159 (cited in note 
7); Michael J. Gerhardt and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Constitutional Theory 3 (Michie, 
1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in San-
ford Levinson. ed., Responding to Imperfection 89 (Princeton U. Press, 1995); David R. 
Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in Responding to Imperfection supra, at 117; Fed-
eralist 22 (Hamilton), The Federalist Papers (cited in note 5); Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); cf. Douglas J. Amy, Real ChoicesWew 
Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation in the United States 27 (Columbia U. 
Press, 1993) ("The notion that legislatures should reflect as accurately as possible the 
political desires of the public is central to most Americans' conception of democracy."). 
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islative bodies generally take action by majority vote, of course, 
but that cannot be what is meant when the American system is 
characterized as "majoritarian," for so do other bodies like the 
United States Supreme Court that are said bX some of the same 
commentators to be "countermajoritarian." If the system is 
said to be majoritarian that must mean that it produces some 
(more or less) systematic translation of the interests or senti-
ments of societal ma!orities into legislation in the image of the 
vote-centered model. 6 
IV 
The problems with the description of the American system 
of government as "majoritarian" are legion. In the national 
government of the United States-unlike a number of individual 
states27 -not a single decision is entrusted to a majority vote of 
The identification of majoritarianism and democratic (including in these cases, constitu· 
tiona!) legitimacy is common to the otherwise very different projects of constitutional 
theorizing by John Ely and Bruce Ackerman. Compare John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U. Press, 1980) with Bruce Ackerman, 1 
We The People: Foundations (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 1991). See Schauer, 
Deliberation About Deliberation, review of We The People, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1187, 1189 
n.4 (1992). Both Ely and Ackerman think that present day American democracy is basi-
cally majoritarian, even if imperfectly so. 
A few of the many references to the United States' system as "majoritarian" in 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court are San Antonio Independent School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964); 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting); Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 598 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971) 
(confusingly appearing to equate a societal and a legislative majority). 
Many of these sources, of course, also often manifest recognition that the 
"majoritarian" characterization is inaccurate to one degree or another. For explicit and 
sustained attention to the limitations, see Komesar, at 67 (cited in note 22); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43,77-83 (1989). 
25. The term was apparently coined by Alexander Bickel, see Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch at 16 (cited in note 24), and has now become standard fare, particu-
larly in scholarly discussion of the Court's role. See Gerhardt and Rowe, Constitutional 
Theory at 3-4 (cited in note 24); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 37-40 
(Little Brown and Co., 3d ed. supp. 1996); William B. Lockhart, et al., Constitutional 
Law 15-17 (West, 1996); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 19-20 (Foundation Press, 
12th ed. 1991); United States~·. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). 
26. This leaves ambiguous whether the relevant majority sentiment is for each 
separate item on the public agenda, or for the entire package. The problems with the 
characterization are largely independent of which meaning is intended. See note 35 and 
accompanying text. 
27. The states generally elect their governors and a varying number of other offi-
cials statewide and by majority vote. In addition, approximately half the states provide 
for a limited degree of lawmaking through different forms of direct vote of the elector-
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the electorate.28 Nor is there any basis for finding an effective 
majoritarianism in the ~rocess.29 Even apart from the appor-
tionment of the Senate (and also putting aside the role of con-
stitutional rights as "trumps" over legislative decisions, and of 
the Supreme Court in elaborating and enforcing those rights), 
any translation of majority sentiments of the electorate at the 
candidate election stage into majority sentiments of the elector-
ate at the stage of legislating is frustrated in a large variety of 
ways. 
To begin with, the vote for a candidate is a terribly blunt in-
strument for expressing sentiments on particular issues of gov-
ernance. It is cast in the secrecy of a polling booth,31 so that 
those elected do not know much for certain about the identity of 
the large majority of their supporters or about the motivations 
behind their votes. In virtually all elections for the national leg-
islature in the United States, a candidate represents a bundle of 
positions, and even if he only campaigns about one or a few he 
will be called upon to vote on many. The vote for a candidate is 
ate. See generally Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 
1503, 1508-48 (1990). 
28. Akhil Amar has recently suggested that a majority of American voters could 
now require Congress to convene a constitutional convention by submitting a petition to 
that effect "and that an amendment could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the 
American electorate." Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, at 89 
n.l (cited in note 24). See also Amar, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. (cited in note 7); Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994). Those familiar with Professor Amar's other works will not 
be surprised that he presents an argument in favor of all this with great skill. But there 
is not a word in the Constitution that would support such a procedure. As suggested in 
the text, moreover, such a procedure is thoroughly at odds with the most fundamental 
assumptions of our constitutional order, including importantly the role of the states. For 
instance, qualification to vote in federal elections was originally and remains to a degree 
within the discretion of the states, see U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 2, cl. 1; Art. II,§ 1; Amend. 
XVII, so that there are not even uniform national qualifications that would seem neces-
sary to give coherence to the notion of a "simple" national majority. 
29. I will not attempt to trace each of the majoritarian limiting points to the indi-
vidual states, but apart from the population based apportionment of state legislatures, 
limited statewide balloting on certain issues, and the popular election of many state 
judges, the limitations on the "majoritarian" character of the national government basi-
cally apply in state contexts as well. 
30. Before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, when Senators 
were chosen by state legislatures, and those bodies in tum were often malapportioned in 
population terms, it was not unheard of to have Senators who, by party affiliation at 
least, were quite unrepresentative of the states they served. See George H. Ha:ynes, I 
The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice 92 (Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1938). 
31. The secret or "Australian" ballot became common in the United States only 
after the presidential election of 1884, which was characterized by "widespread charges 
of voting frauds." Dahl, Critics at 234 (cited in note 20). 
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thus opaque with regard to most of the actual decisions that 
legislatures will make.32 Indeed in most elections the vote is 
probably cast as much with an eye on the past and the present as 
on the future, when there are still decisions to be made. To be 
sure, there is communication between voters and their represen-
tatives between elections, and the contemplation of a future is 
always providing incentives for the here and now. But it is en-
tirely unrealistic to think that the members of the legislative 
body collect the sentiments of majorities in their districts as the 
basis for decision on many, or perhaps even any, of the votes 
they will cast. They do not have the ability to do so, but they 
also do not have the motivation. 
The principle reason for the absence of motivation is asso-
ciated with what is called "the interest group theory of legisla-
tion."33 The basic insight of interest group theorists is that rela-
tively small numbers of voters with large individual stakes in 
some issue or set of issues will have the motivation to wade in 
politically on those issues, while voters with smaller individual 
stakes will not, even if they are more numerous. Interest group 
theorists emphasize the political use of organized groups by 
those with the larger stakes. We will return in Section XI to the 
political role of organized interests. For present purposes, how-
ever, it is important to appreciate the force of the interest group 
insight even when organized groups play no special role. 
The private effects of essentially all public decisions are dis-
tributed differentially. This is so regardless of the root motiva-
tion behind the decision, be it self-interest or public-spiritedness 
(assuming we can make coherent the distinction between the 
two). Thus not only do tobacco growers benefit from tobacco 
subsidies while most people do not, but military contractors 
(among others) benefit more than the rest of us from expendi-
tures for national defense, and manufacturers of air and water 
purification devices (among others) benefit disproportionately 
from efforts to clean up our common environment. 
The differential distribution of effects is not limited to large 
ones like those felt by defense contractors, nor to persons who 
32. To say the least, "[e]lections are clumsy tools for setting policy." Garry Wills, 
What Happened to the Revolution?, N.Y. Rev. of Books, June 6, 1996, at 11. (Vol. XLIII, 
No. 10). 
33. For an interesting discussion see Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 54-81 
(cited in note 22); see also William N. Eskridge. Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Cases and 
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 49·51 (West, 2d ed. 
1995) ("Legislation"). 
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supply rather than consume goods and services. The most mun-
dane of public programs-highway construction, police protec-
tion, provision of libraries (and taxation programs to pay for any 
or all of these)-have differential effects on consumers as well 
as suppliers, for some of us drive, read, or require police services 
(and pay taxes) more than others. Nor need the effects be nar-
rowly material, rather than ideological, as the ongoing American 
dispute about abortion dramatically illustrates. Engagement on 
that issue ranges from the extraordinarily passionate on both 
sides to the ambivalent or indifferent. 
This differential distribution of effects is then associated 
with differential interest in the political realm. These differen-
tial political interests can be expressed through support of 
groups that pursue the interests politically, but even if the inter-
ests do not justify that degree of involvement, they can be ex-
pressed through voting behavior. We are more likely to vote at 
all when there is an issue at stake that matters especially to us, 
and we are more likely to have our votes swayed by a candi-
date's stand on such an issue.34 Since candidates for public office 
understand all this, the politics of interests is everyman's politics 
and not just that of organized groups. To the extent that candi-
dates' positions are designed to attract votes and can be targeted 
to do so, those positions will be geared not to majority senti-
ments on particular issues but, issue by issue, to sentiments of 
those whose votes are in play.35 
34. For a discussion of why people vote at all, given the ineffectiveness of the indi· 
vidual's vote as a determinant of policy, see text at notes 100-101. Whatever the expla-
nation, it is unarguable that people do vote in large numbers, and, it seems to me, virtu-
ally as unarguable that an individual's vote is significantly responsive to candidates' 
positions on particular issues. 
35. Most of the rhetoric of "'majoritarianism" seems to assume that it applies issue 
by issue. This is reflected, for instance, in the constant public opinion polling to deter-
mine what a "'majority of the American people" feel about this or that. But the 
"'majoritarian" label seems no more likely to be an apt description of sentiment for the 
complete package of public policies adopted in some constrained time frame. If candi-
dates had even rough and ready information about voter sentiments on the entire range 
of issues and the tradeoffs those voters would make among those positions (voter A, for 
instance, would be willing to sacrifice a modestly more pro-choice position on abortion 
for greater combat readiness of our armed forces), then the package of positions the 
candidates espouse might conceivably be seen as reflecting estimates of electoral senti-
ment of their constituents summed over the entire public agenda. And if elected legisla-
tors then traded their votes in order to maximize the satisfactions captured in the pro-
grams that got them elected, the eventual public policy package might with a straight 
face be depicted as a summed majoritarianism. But candidates and legislators have nei-
ther anything remotely approximating the information base about electoral sentiment 
nor the incentive structure within the legislature that might justify such a characteriza-
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In other respects the discontinuity or slippage between 
majority sentiments and outputs in the legislative stage was built 
in at bedrock to the American system of government. Perhaps 
most fundamentally (though not much discussed36), in the 
United States members of legislatures are typically chosen in 
geographically defined districts, with a single representative for 
each district (two in the case of the United States Senate). This 
raises the real possibility that the legislature may not mirror the 
political complexion of the legislature's constituency as a whole. 
Thus a country of sixty percent Libertarians and forty percent 
Vegetarians divided into three "fairly" apportioned (i.e., by 
population) single member districts for a unicameral legislature 
could elect a Vegetarian majority if one of the districts con-
tained only Libertarians and the other two districts split the re-
maining Libertarians evenly between them. 37 And even if geo-
graphically based single member legislative districts do not 
produce a legislative majority for a minority party, the geo-
graphical clumping of voters can easily yield less dramatic devia-
tions in the legislature from the distribution of political senti-
ment in the electorate as a whole.38 In addition such districts 
probably provide important incentives for a system of two major 
political parties39 which tends to clump the legislature as well, ef-
fectively excluding from representation in that body even quite 
significant pockets of popular sentiment that might otherwise 
have found expression in additional parties. 
The possibility of large scale slippage between the candi-
date election stage and the legislating stage is not inevitable. In 
a number of democracies, at least a part of the legislature is cho-
sen from party lists or through other mechanisms that assure 
that political parties are represented in the legislature in rough 
tion-even before we get to the difficulties to which the text (supplemented by footnote 
46) now turns. 
36. In the legal literature at least. The subject is discussed by political scientists. 
See, e.g., Jonathon Riley, American Democracy and Majority Rule, in Nomos XXXII at 
267 (cited in note 20). 
37. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 85-87 (1986) (O'Connor, 1., concur-
ring). 
38. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986). 
39. This is often called "Duverger's Law." See Maurice Duverger, Political Par-
ties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 217 (Barbara North & Robert 
North trans., Wiley, 2d ed. rev. 1959). It is usually accepted as accurate, even if its 
causal underpinnings are debatable. See Andrew Reeve and Alan Ware, Electoral Sys-
tems: A Comparative and Theoretical Introduction 9 (Routledge, 1992); William H. 
Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lipjhart, eds., Elec-
toral Laws and Their Political Consequences 19, 41 (Agathon Press, 1986). 
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proportion to their national support. A whole-hearted system of 
"proportional representation" like this would be likely to be 
characterized by multiple parties and to yield a legislature that 
reflected, more or less, the genuine political complexity of the 
jurisdiction as a whole.40 
In the debates surrounding the ratification of the United 
States Constitution, there was little explicit attention paid to the 
"distorting" effect of geographically based districts, perhaps be-
cause they were used in England41 or, even more likely, because 
the integrity of the states, themselves geographically defined, 
was an unchallengeable assumption in the deliberations. But 
given this setting, political "representativeness" of the legisla-
ture may not have seemed important, for it was not uniformly 
assumed that the job of members of the legislature was to trans-
form electoral sentiments into legislation as the vote-centered 
model with its talk of "majoritarianism" assumes. 
Recall that political parties did not become a fixture of 
American politics until later42 and that neither the Senate nor 
the President was to be directly elected under the original Con-
stitution. Even with regard to the House of Representatives, 
there was no shared assumption that it would simply recreate 
what the electorate would have wanted had it been possible to 
bring it together in one large voting assembly. Some made that 
assumption,43 but according to James Madison, our chief consti-
tutional architect, "the delegation of the government ... to a 
small number of citizens elected by the rest" would serve to 
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through 
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may 
best discern the true interest of their country and whose pa-
triotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation 
it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the 
40. See generally Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An 
Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes 7-10 (New York U. Press, 1994); see 
Dahl, Critics at 110, 149 (cited in. note 20) (characterizing the electoral systems of the 
United States, along with those in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as 
"highly defective" for not adopting proportional representation). 
41. See generally, Reeve and Ware, Electoral System at 45-48 (cited in note 39); 
Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 77, 161-62 (1985). 
42. See James MacGregor Bums, The Vineyard of Liberty 134 (Alfred A. Knopf, 
1982); see generally Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System (InstitUte 
of Early American History and Culture, 1956). 
43. See the comments of Philanthrop, Wilson, Adams, and American us III, cited in 
note 19. 
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representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the 
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, 
44 
convened for the purpose. 
499 
In any event, other elements were consciously included in 
the national government to assure that there was no simple 
translation of electoral sentiment into legislation as the vote-
centered model assumes- a bicameral legislature with the two 
houses of different sizes chosen in different ways from differ-
ently configured districts45 and for different terms, sharing power 
with two other branches independent of it, and all superimposed 
on, and dividing governmental powers with, a preexisting system 
of various state governments. In such a setting the characteriza-
tion of the United States system as "majoritarian" fundamen-
tally misapprehends what is going on. Strongly committed, du-
rable, and large supermajorities in the United States will almost 
surely prevail through the political system (here including the 
judicial system) over the medium to long run. Beyond that, 
however, given the layers of "distorting" influences,46 we are 
44. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at 77-'8.2 (cited in note 5). Else-
where Madison was more colorful-and harsh- in his characterizations of direct democ-
racy. Thus in discussing the optimal size of the legislature in Federalist 55, Madison said 
"(i]n all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails 
to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every 
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob." Federalist 55, The Federalist Papers at 
341, 342 (cited in note 5). A variety of additional models of democracy emphasizing the 
independence of officials pretty clearly trace their lineage to the Madisonian vision. See 
generally Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 123 (cited in note 33) (discussing 
"agency" and "trustee" models of democratic representation, drawn from the conceptu-
alization in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (U. of California 
Press, 1967)). 
45. The "districts" are identical when a state is entitled to only one representative, 
or, as sometimes happens, elects at large one or more members of a multi-member 
House delegation. The latter practice has long been disfavored by Congress. See Whit-
comb v. Chavis, 403 U.S 124,158 n.39 (1971). 
46. The "distorting influences" are nowhere near exhausted by those mentioned in 
the text. Largely unnoted among the distortions is that children are not allowed to vote. 
If one assumes that children are to be taken into account in the majoritarian calculus, 
then this represents a large potential distortion. Even if we engage in the assumption 
that parents are acceptable surrogates to represent the interests of their children, those 
parents do not receive the extra votes that might be thought to do the trick. Among the 
other distortions are that many of those eligible do not vote in candidate elections, and 
that just who of those eligible does turn out to vote may be affected, among other things, 
by the weather; that not all legislators may vote, with abstention caused, for instance, by 
illness; that ballot position may swing candidate elections; that third party candidacies 
may affect outcomes, especially given the plurality selection norm, see text at note 73-
74, infra, that when there are more than two choices, the problem of circular voting may 
mean that there is no choice that can be said to be that of a majority; that non-
majoritarian cont.rol of the agenda (necessitated, inter alia, by the circular voting prob-
lem) can deterrnme outcomes; that the rhetoric in which issues are debated may be 
h1ghly mfluent1al; and that dramatiC developments in the world (and the way they are 
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surely kidding ourselves if we believe that any sustained and 
even approximately systematic correlation-majoritarian or 
otherwise-exists between electoral inputs into a policy-making 
mix and legislative outcomes.47 
v 
The ready acceptance of the Senate's apportionment helps 
bring into focus a more fruitful way of thinking about 
democracy in the United States-what I call "democracy as 
meaningful conversation" -under which essentially the entire 
electorate is engaged on an ongoing basis by meaningful public 
conversation about public policy. The conversation in the 
model is the totality of public conversation about public policy, 
about what actions government should take and refrain from 
taking. In this expansive sense, the democratic conversation 
seems to be everywhere in the United States. It is obviously 
seen on the electoral hustings, but it is also ongoing between 
electoral campaigns, on radio and television, and in newspapers 
and barber shops and the routines of stand-up comics. As far as 
I can tell, to one degree or another it is also ubiquitous in other 
genuine democracies, while nothing quite like it exists in non-
democratic countries. 
I advance this conversational model as fundamentally de-
scriptive and explanatory, rather than normative, as a tool to 
help "us to understand what is going on by enabling us to or-
ganise our thoughts."48 I believe that the conversational model 
provides a coherent account of diverse phenomena of democ-
reported in the press) closely preceding an election or legislative vote will often be in· 
fluential. On top of all these, and in part no doubt because of at least some of them, citi· 
zen preferences are not necessarily stable in a way that would provide integrity to the 
process of translation of those preferences into policy outcomes at what will necessarily 
be a later time. 
47. Cf. Russell Hardin, Public Choice Versus Democracy, in Nomos XXXII at 185, 
195 (cited in note 20) ("Even on the most favorable accounts of voter sophistication and 
the quality of voter decisions, however, one cannot make strong claims that the outcome 
of democratic voting procedures is a coherent mapping of citizen preferences onto poli-
cies"); Rosen in Nomos XXXII at 33 (cited in note 20) ("The phrase 'majority rule' or 
the 'majoritarian principle,' once removed from the context of direct democracy, be-
comes misleading and even dangerous if it implies a measure of direct popular control 
over government"). 
48. R. H. Coase, How Economists Should Choose in Essays on Economics and 
Economists 15, 16-17 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994). In addition, "by unifying apparently 
diverse phenomena ... [models] can change the way we look at the empirical 
world .... " John Ferejohn and Debra Satz, Unification, Universalism, and Rational 
Choice Theory, in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy 71, 72 (Yale 
U. Press, 1996). 
1997) DEMOCRACY AS CONVERSATION 501 
racy in the United States-including its most fundamental ele-
ments and extending to more surface phenomena like the ab-
sence of controversy surrounding the apportionment of the Sen-
ate. One of the reasons democracies are useful things to 
understand better is that they have proved enduring, and it is 
the endurance, the stability of democracies, that is at the core of 
what I seek to describe and explain. The conversational model 
posits that the backbone of democracy, the source of much of 
the popular respect it commands, and hence of much of its 
strength and stability, is to be found not in popular sovereignty 
expressed through voting, nor in some pattern of results at the 
end of the legislative process, but in involvement of the elector-
ate in the democratic conversation. 
The model carries no pretense of complete depiction of 
democracy in the United States, or even of explaining com-
pletely what makes that democracy stable. The model ignores 
the level of economic well-being, as well as the distribution of 
that well-being, each of which may well have an impact on the 
stability of any democracy. It does not include any special role 
for political parties, which are surely important "mediating insti-
tutions"49 that contribute to the effective functioning of the sys-
tem as a whole, to its appeal and to its stability. It does not in-
clude the role of "rights" that define the boundary between 
public power and individual prerogative, though any full de-
scription of American democracy would have to take account of 
the role of rights. And, a related point, democracy as meaning-
ful conversation does not include any searching integration of 
the role of the Courts as constitutional policy makers.5(1 What 
the model does posit is that the engagement of the electorate in 
the democratic conversation is an important cause of the stabil-
ity of democracies, or at least of the United States' variant on 
the theme, a cause decidedly more important than the sense of 
involvement in majoritarian "self-government" that comes from 
periodic candidate elections. 
If one believes, as I surely do, that, other things being equal, 
stability in political systems is a good thing, then a model that 
49. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1479, 1522-30 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Instiltl-
tional Transformation of Interests, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1443, 14fi0-65 (1994 ). 
50. I will touch on the role of the courts, see notes 85-88 and accompanying text, 
but the touch will be only a light one, for any full exploration of their role would take me 
far afield from my present ambitions for examining democracy as meaningful conversa-
tion. 
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explains stability will invite normative judgments. In this lim-
ited sense democracy as meaningful conversation has normative 
purchase, as a byproduct of any descriptive and explanatory per-
suasiveness it may hold. Still I want to be clear that democracy 
as meaningful conversation is not a normative model in any 
fuller sense. The conversational model is perfectly consistent 
with "democratic" reforms in the spirit of any number of differ-
ent normative models of democracy, including the vote-centered 
model that I described in Section III, if advanced in a normative 
rather than a descriptive spirit. 
A number of political philosophers and democratic theo-
rists have noted a connection in one way or another between 
democracy and popular involvement in conversation about pub-
lic policy.'1 Thus the importance of public "deliberation" is a 
major theme of contemporary proponents of "civic republican-
ism. "52 The focus of these efforts is avowedly normative, the 
charting of a way to make democracy better through pursuit of a 
vision of the good and full citizen. Among these civic republi-
cans some seem quite often to be charting that better future 
with a vote-centered compass, suffusing their vision with an em-
phasis, something like that of the Supreme Court in Reynolds, 
on equalizing the effective voices of all voters in a "deliberative 
democracy."'3 The inspiration for the conversational model is, 
as I have said, quite different. It is to order and explain the way 
51. See, e.g., John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 24 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1935), in 2 The Later Works, quoted in Sandel, Dewey Rides Again, N.Y. Rev. of Books 
35,36 (May 9, 1996); Post, Constitutional Domains at 185-87, 273-75 (cited in note 24); 
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 284-88 (Russel and Russell, Anders 
Wedberg trans. 1961), quoted in Post, Constitutional Domains at 185 (cited in note 24); 
James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform 
(Yale U. Press, 1991 ); MichaeiJ. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of 
a Public Philosophy (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 1996); F. A. Hayek, The Con-
stitution of Liberty 108-09 (U. of Chicago Press, 1960); Ackerman, We the People (ctted 
in note 24); Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democ-
racy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 
2121,2193 (1990); Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (cited in note 20); Page, Who De-
liberates? (cited in note 20); see generally William Rehg, Translator's Introduction to 
Jurgen Habennas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy ix (MIT Press, 1996). 
52. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Go~·ernment, 100 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4, 19 (1986); Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (cited in note 51); Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993). See also, e.g., Thomas Chris-
tiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order in Nomos XXXVIII at 251, Political 
Order (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., New York U. Press, 1993). 
53. I discuss some of these matters in a review of Cass Sunstein's book, The Partial 
Constitution, (cited in note 52). See Robert W. Bennett, Of Gnarled Pegs and Round 
Holes: Sunstein 's Civic Republicanism and the American Constitution, 11 Const. Comm. 
395,409-17 (1994). 
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things are, rather than as they might be or should be. Its norma-
tive implications are incidental rather than central, in contrast to 
the centrality of normative considerations to the civic republican 
effort and others that have heretofore laid stress on delibera-
tion. 
VI 
Democracy as meaningful conversation pivots on the incen-
tive structure provided to elected officials by the prospect of 
elections. Because I call the contrasting model "vote-centered," 
some might think that the electoral process must be peripheral 
at best to the conversational model. To the contrary, while I 
want to emphasize the role of the democratic conversation in 
inducing fidelity to democracy, and de-emphasize voting as gov-
ernance, the conversational model nonetheless posits that elec-
tions are important to democracy in two different ways. First, 
the act of voting is itself part of the democratic conversation. As 
conversation, voting is not very directed, but it occasionally can 
bring the satisfaction of having sent a "message," however 
muted, and however uncertain the sender must typically remain 
that the message was received. Second, and more importantly, 
elections shape incentives that provide the essential support for 
the broader conversation. There does not seem to me to be any 
plausible explanation for the democratic conversation, including 
the time and energy devoted to persuasiveness in it, save that 
periodic, genuinely contested elections, make the conversation 
matter. 
The incentive posited for candidates is the desire to be 
elected and then reelected. This is the same incentive assumed 
by public choice theorists, at least since Anthony Downs' classic 
work, An Economic Theory of Democracy.;~ The real world 
complex of motivations will, of course, vary from one candidate 
or official to another, and typically be much richer than un-
adorned ambition to be elected or reelected.;; But models de-
pend on such simplifying assumptions, and this one seems plau-
sible enough. Starting with this motivation of officials, I think it 
can be shown that meaningful public conversation about public 
54. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) (cited in note 15). 
55. See Daniel A. Farber and PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 21-33 (U. 
of Chicago Press, 1991 ). 
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policy involving a very large proportion of the electorate is all 
but certain to follow. 56 
I want to be clear about what I am using "meaningful" to 
mean. There are two interrelated components to the concept as 
applied to the democratic conversation. First, an element of the 
conversation is politically meaningful when what is said in it has 
a real, even if only vanishingly small, chance to influence public 
decision makers in public policy choices. There is no assump-
tion under the model that any individual's views will end up 
changing a result, nor of systematic transformation of electoral 
sentiment into legislation. To have had a real chance to influ-
ence does not even mean that the element of the conversation 
must have come to the attention of a decision maker, but rather 
that it have genuinely entered into the process of give and take 
that eventuates in a decision. 
Second, the democratic conversation is personally meaning-
ful to a member of the electorate when the political meaningful-
ness of one or more of its elements stimulates a sense for that 
member of respectful engagement in the decision making proc-
ess, a sense that the conversation included those politically 
meaningful elements in part at least because that member's 
opinions on those elements mattered. Political meaningfulness 
feeds the sense of personal meaningfulness, and it is the latter 
that is the stabilizing force within the model I propose. 
This personal meaningfulness has broader ramifications, for 
like all sustained conversational interactions, the individual's in-
volvement in the democratic conversation becomes an integral 
part of a set of relationships that the individual has with other 
conversants and with the social and political system in which the 
conversational activity is embedded. The conversation then be-
comes significant to the individual not solely, and perhaps not 
even mostly, because of some possibility that it will persuade, 
but because it is a part of that individual's sense of self. This in 
turn brings the conversant back for more conversation-to per-
suade and be persuaded and just to converse. 
There is no requirement of logical coherence for an element 
of the conversation or of grounding in truth or in well-
established factual premises. Much less need the conversation 
be acceptable according to all or any theories of morality. The 
conversational appeal to voters can be on whatever level en-
56. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
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gages them. History is replete with examples of "meaningful" 
public conversation in this latitudinarian sense which is also de-
monstrably false or morally repugnant. Such moral repugnance, 
or even more minor conversational sins, will often alienate some 
voters as it engages others. The fact that the conversation is 
public surely has the salutary effect of dampening some appeals 
to pure self-interest and to baser emotions that might otherwise 
be politically tempting. 57 The fact that it is politically meaningful 
provides incentives for those who think they spot error to wade 
in with rebuttal of the false or scurrilous. And the net effect of 
the social heterogeneity of the United States probably serves to 
contain the mischief that appeal to baser instincts might pro-
duce. This last was an article of faith for James Madison, and we 
will explore it and related points below.58 In any event, while 
there surely is an enormous volume of well-reasoned argumen-
tation on a vast array of subjects in the totality of the democratic 
conversation, there is nothing in the concept of meaningfulness 
as I am using the term that excludes error, repugnance, or the 
disengagement of some voters that these can bring. 
Unlike the vote-centered model, democracy as meaningful 
conversation attempts no explanation of substantive outcomes 
in terms of electoral inputs. Obviously many people are pas-
sionately concerned with substantive outcomes, some quite of-
ten, and more on certain occasions. For many the prospect of 
influencing outcomes, or at least enjoying them, surely intensi-
fies the sense of involvement in the democratic process, includ-
ing in the democratic conversation. And thanks to the exten-
siveness of the public agenda, the great majority of people see 
their favore~ positions on public questions emerge triumphant 
on occasion.'9 But one of the interesting things about democracy 
is that substantively disappointed voters are so readily recon-
ciled to their losses. In genuine democracies, where elections 
are truly competitive, votes on many public issues are likely to 
be close, yielding large numbers of voters who are more than 
occasionally disappointed with outcomes. The easy reconcilia-
tion of the disappointed is thus important to democratic stabil-
ity. Some posited relationship of voter inputs to policy outputs 
over the larger public policy agenda is altogether too abstract 
57. "[The] dialogic enterprise always has built-in moral features or commitments 
that constrain the conversation." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the 
Understanding of Public Law, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123, 129 (1989). 
58. See Section XI. 
59. See text at notes 63-66. 
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and too tenuous to look to it for explanation of the reconcilia-
tion.60 
The reasons for the loyalty of electoral losers are surely 
complex, and much of the explanation is just as surely to be 
found outside the confines of the conversational model. The 
lion's share of what matters to most of us proceeds through pri-
vate channels, not public ones. If we find abundant private ful-
fillment, we may more easily adjust even to persistent disap-
pointment in public affairs. Precisely for this reason, a large 
field of private opportunity in a polity-of both the economic 
and more personal sorts-may help account for the stability of 
many democracies. In addition, particularly in large and het-
erogeneous democracies like the United States, electoral losers 
one day may look forward to whatever joy victory, and its 
promise of different substantive outcomes, might bring another 
day. For local issues at least, electoral losers might even con-
template moving to a more congenial location. Or they may 
identify with winners in other districts and the part those win-
ners can play in the eventual decisions that are made. In part, 
outcomes are not so purely a function of electoral winners and 
losers. They are often compromises, again induced partly by the 
fact that no sooner is one election over than another one is in 
contemplation in which the votes of yesterday's losers will count 
again. And not all electoral losers-or non-participants-are 
easily reconciled. But democracy as meaningful conversation 
posits that a centrally important part of what commands the loy-
alty of losing electoral minorities most of the time is that they 
are nonetheless engaged by meaningful democratic conversa-
tion, and it is that fact that matters more than some felt equality 
in voting privileges, patterned outcomes of the process, or even 
the prospect that the future will provide victory to make up for 
the defeats of the past.61 
It might be thought that no conversational involvement by a 
member of the electorate could be any more politically 
"meaningful" than that person's vote, which, as we have seen, is 
close to zero. This is both wrong and beside the point. It is 
wrong because there is a very large conversational agenda, with 
no individual interested in anything approaching all of it. Just as 
with the vote, the average member of the electorate is unlikely 
to be decisive on any given item of that agenda. Still, as a simple 
60. See Section IV. 
61. Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale U. Press, 1990). 
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mathematical matter, a typical democratic citizen will be likely 
to find conversational topics where he can have an appreciably 
greater influence on outcomes than he would with a vote in a 
candidate election. Of much more significance, however, the 
conversation is ongoing, multifaceted and nuanced. A member 
of the electorate can to a great degree adjust his conversational 
involvement to his schedule, his level of interest in a particular 
topic, his taste in commentators, and his personal interest in ac-
tive involvement. The vote in candidate elections is in contrast a 
rather sterile form of political involvement.62 For these reasons 
the conversation has the capacity to involve a member of the 
electorate in the ongoing process of government and thence into 
a web of relationships in a way that the vote standing alone does 
not. If members of a democratic electorate do have a real sense 
that they are engaged in something appropriately called "self-
government," that sense is more likely produced by the demo-
cratic conversation than it is by the opportunity periodically to 
cast a vote in candidate elections. 
There is no way conclusively to prove the political meaning-
fulness of any part of the democratic conversation, and hence no 
way to be sure that any sense that it generates of personal 
meaningfulness is not grounded in self-delusion. There are sto-
ries, of course, about the power of ideas, and anecdotes to be 
told about the marginal views of one generation becoming the 
accepted wisdom of the next. We need look no further for ex-
amples than the history of women's role in contemporary 
American society, or of public policy toward smoking. In the fi-
nal analysis, however, with controlled experimentation unavail-
able, the political meaningfulness of the bulk of the democratic 
conversation can only be surmised. For myself, the principle ba-
sis for believing that the great bulk of the democratic conversa-
tion is politically meaningful is the enormous time and energy 
devoted to it, including by a large number of sophisticated par-
ticipants. If self-delusion there be, it is both widespread and ter-
ribly stubborn. 
62. I do not doubt that elections ''remain an important part of the nation's legiti· 
mizing myth" and serve to a degree "to create and maintain a sense of national solidar-
ity and community." Kim Ezra Shienbaum, Beyond the Electoral Connection: A Reas-
sessment of the Role of Voting in Contemporary American Politics 123, 125 (U. of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1984). The fact that many non-democratic countries adopt the form 
of elections suggests that they see such symbolic power in elections, but as such coun-
tries regularly learn the form without the substance is eventually seen to be empty, even 
as symbol. The "substance," I am suggesting, is to be found, at least in the United 
States, in meaningful conversation about public policy. 
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VII 
The democratic conversation is not exclusively, nor even 
mostly, a simple two-way exchange between representatives and 
their constituents. Nor is it confined to the time frame of elec-
tion campaigns, where the vacuousness and frequent insincerity 
of much of what is said may well produce as much alienation as 
engagement. The personal meaningfulness of the conversation 
is no doubt in general heightened for a voter when he has a 
sense of direct communication flowing to or from a candidate or 
elected official This might be called "primary" democratic con-
versation. But participation by candidates or officials is not re-
quired. In any count of verbiage, the volume of "secondary" 
conversation would surely dwarf that which takes place more di-
rectly between candidates or representatives and their constitu-
ents. This secondary conversation involves non-elected officials, 
and professional and amateur commentators employed or given 
exposure by innumerable media of communication. Secondary 
conversation includes much give and take among ordinary vot-
ers, or even non-citizens, expressing their views on public issues 
in all manner of public forums. The conversational model posits 
that even the secondary conversation is to a very great extent an 
outgrowth of the candidate election process and the relation-
ships and incentives that it defines. 
An important distinction should also be drawn between ac-
tive and passive involvement in the conversation. In both pri-
mary and secondary conversation there are numerous active 
participants. But most direct involvement in the conversation is 
passive. Members of the electorate are much more often con-
sumers of what is being said than active participants. Given the 
number of members of the electorate and the possibility of mul-
tiple listeners for each speaker that is a feature of communica-
tion by mass media, it is to be expected that much more time 
will be spent listening than speaking. For most elements of the 
democratic conversation most members of the electorate will 
likely not even be listening. Any individual member of the elec-
torate will be out of the range of most of the conversation, for 
in addition to lots of disinterest, there is simply too much of the 
conversation. But universal, or even widespread, attention to 
any particular part is not required for conversational engage-
ment, for the conversation is so varied and so ubiquitous that 
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the vast majority of members of the electorate will find some-
thing engaging in it.63 
To see why this should be so, it is instructive to take a closer 
look at the incentive structure of active participants in the con-
versation, starting with the elected official or candidate for 
elected office.64 Given the incentive posited to be elected or 
reelected, the candidate seeks to find a way to command a plu-
rality of those voting at _the next election. Votes are inter-
changeable in the count,6' and, to some extent at least unde-
pendable, in the sense that candidates never know for sure who 
may vote for them. Indeed, thanks to the secrecy of the ballot, 
candidates have no terribly reliable way even to find out who 
has done so after the fact. As a first cut, candidates thus have an 
incentive to communicate with each and every member of the 
electorate, since each one represents a potential vote in an un-
certain count. 
It will often be efficient for a candidate to communicate a 
single message to a broad segment of the electorate, since mass 
media may make it little more expensive to reach a broad audi-
ence than a limited one. But there is also the possibility of tar-
geting messages to discrete audiences, and an extended public 
agenda is a great aid in attempting to do so. The electorate is 
varied, and its members vote not en masse but one at a time. 
This opens up the possibility that some voters can be addressed 
on certain issues and others on different ones, to the basic satis-
faction of each. Indeed because of the differential interest in is-
sues, a candidate's combined stance on two issues can on bal-
ance satisfy each of two groups of voters even though each of 
the groups disagrees with the candidate on one of the issues. 
With an extensive public agenda, it then becomes possible for 
candidates to reach and appeal to a large part of a segmented 
electorate. 
63. Benjamin Page seems to me to miss this point when he moves from the obser-
vation that active participation in deliberation cannot be available to the entire elector-
ate to the conclusion that we therefore ''delegate deliberation." See Page, Who Deliber-
ates? at 4 (cited in note 20). 
64. To avoid constant repetition, I will refer only to the "candidate" in the discus-
sion of these incentives. I choose that word to make clear that non-incumbents running 
for office play a very important role as participants, and as stimuli for the conversation. 
I want to be clear, however, that much of the conversational behavior under discussion 
occurs outside the time frame of an election campaign. 
65. The sole important exception to this in the United States is in presidential elec-
tions, where by virtue of the electoral college apportionment by states, a vote in one 
state is not the equivalent of a vote in another. 
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This incentive to reach out to all voters is qualified in at 
least three ways. First, some districts will be reasonably safe for 
the incumbent or the nominee of one party or another, in which 
case there will not be much incentive for that candidate to reach 
out to groups of voters perceived as unnecessary for election. 
Nor will there be incentive to address voters whose views are so 
highly idiosyncratic across the range of politically salient matters 
that resources will be better spent sowing in more fertile elec-
toral fields. And most importantly, the various interests among 
the electorate may conflict with one another, so that what 
pleases one will simultaneously displease another to the point of 
alienation and opposition. This produces an incentive to mute 
or entirely avoid contentious elements of the conversation66 and 
when avoidance won't suffice, to disavow positions that might 
drive into opposition more voters than it would attract. 
The power of each of these qualifications is in turn limited 
by a variety of considerations. Of crucial importance is the pos-
sibility of electoral challenge in both party primaries (where 
they are held) and general elections. Voters neglected or alien-
ated by one candidate will be especially appealing targets for 
engagement by a challenger. In addition, even a dominant can-
didate is faced with one degree or another of uncertainty on a 
number of fronts. He is uncertain about just who his supporters 
are, about why they have been supporters, about what may re-
cently have come to matter more to even known supporters, or 
less, about the identity and thrust of electoral challenges that 
may be in the offing. Some information will be available on 
some of these matters, but uncertainty will remain, and that un-
certainty will counsel even a dominant candidate to err on the 
side of extending rather than limiting attempts broadly to en-
gage the electorate. Uncertainty also creates an incentive in a 
dominant candidate to gather information-to listen as well as 
speak-and not just to state positions that may appeal but to 
convince, to provide argumentation about what items should be 
on the public agenda and about what should be done about 
them. 
No single candidate, moreover, nor even a set of competi-
tors, can control the shape the conversation will take. Third par-
ties-media, commentators, and more casual kibbitzers-play 
an important role in defining the nature and reach of the con-
versation, and they have all manner of incentives that do not 
66. See Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy at 135-37 (cited in note 15}. 
1997] DEMOCRACY AS CONVERSATION 511 
necessarily map onto those of any candidate. Specialized media 
have incentives to target audiences and expose them to public 
policy issues of importance to them, even when candidates do 
not. Mass media have incentives to maximize their audiences. 
They will often do so by reaching out to a large variety of audi-
ences, adopting the stance of reporters of developments rather 
than advocates. What is embarrassing to candidates is at least as 
fit for their purposes as what is pleasing. And commentators 
will comment about anything that moves them, limited to be 
sure by their capacity to find media to give exposure to their 
views. These various third parties will exert constant pressure 
on candidates to be drawn into conversation they might other-
wise have neglected. 
Also important in extending the democratic conversation is 
the variety of offices open to popular election. These vary 
greatly along lines of public policy coverage. And they vary in 
geographical coverage, in the United States from the President, 
through Senate and House districts, on down to representatives 
to local school boards. The large variety of elected officials in 
the United States may on occasion be conversationally counter-
productive if it strains the voters' conversational stamina.67 But 
it does enrich the conversational possibilities in at least three 
ways. It adds a further measure of competitiveness into the 
conversational incentive structure. Even a candidate for local 
dog catcher can challenge the President of the United States on 
some issue or other. It slices issues and constituencies up in a 
variety of ways that can then appeal to different grouping of 
voters and in different ways. And it provides multiple focal 
points for the especially intense conversational involvement that 
comes from the direct participation of the candidate or official. 
The net result of these incentives is what we observe, a sprawl-
ing, unwieldy-and politically meaningful-public conversation 
about public policy, characterized by diversity and flexibility in 
its capacity to engage the citizenry. 
VIII 
Under democracy as meaningful conversation the appor-
tionment of the United States Senate is basically unproblematic, 
so that its failure to generate controversy presents no puzzle. 
The "weight" of a person's vote is essentially irrelevant, since in 
67. See text at note 80. 
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virtually all elections in a polity of any significant size, no per-
son's vote weighs enough to matter. Under the model, it is not 
the vote cast for an official, but the conversation instigated by 
the prospect of elections that matters to members of the citi-
zenry, and in that respect the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives are basically equivalent.68 
The choice of geographically based candidate elections over 
a system of proportional representation may, however, be of 
great importance. Systems of proportional representation seem 
ready made for a vote-centered model of democracy, since, al-
lowing for the admittedly substantial simplification that alle-
giance to parties requires, they transmit sentiment in the elec-
torate intact into the legislature.69 In contrast, geographically 
based candidate elections, as we have seen, open up the real 
possibility of disparity between electoral sentiment-even as 
gauged by party allegiance-and the makeup of the legislature. 
They also raise difficult questions under the vote-centered 
model of whether a representative represents all the constitu-
ents of the district, or just those who voted for him. By the light 
of democracy as meaningful conversation, however, geographi-
cally based candidate elections serve a very real purpose. They 
define a special relationship between those elected (and those 
seeking to be elected), on the one hand, and their constituencies 
on the other, directing the focused concern of each to the con-
versational involvement of the other. Freed from the vote as the 
focal point for popular involvement in governance, this relation-
ship is ongoing, and it can then transcend partisan electoral poli-
tics. Thus we typically find that representatives in the United 
States speak of "my" constituents and members of the elector-
ate of "my" Senator and "my" Representative, regardless of 
what may have taken place in the secrecy of the election booth. 
There may, however, be subtle differences in methods of 
districting that can affect the personal meaningfulness of the 
democratic conversation for members of the electorate. Per-
sonal meaningfulness will likely be fostered if voters find it eas-
ier to keep track of who is representing them, at whom their par-
68. Even the complete absence of representation in the Senate for the electorate in 
the District of Columbia and American territories leaves occasion for a measure of 
democratic conversation (albeit an impoverished measure, see text at note 676), on ac-
count of other offices that remain subject to popular election. 
69. See Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering at 58 (cited in note 40) 
(the "undisputed merit ... [of systems of proportional representation] is fairness in rep-
resentation "). 
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ticipation in the conversation is ultimately aimed. Because 
House districts are usually less populous than states/0 House 
elections more frequent than those for the Senate, and because 
most individuals have two Senators but only one Representa-
tive, the voters might be thought to find it easier to keep up with 
the identity of their representative in the House, rather than 
that of their Senators. That must have been the original consti-
tutional assumption, when Senators were to be chosen not in 
popular elections but by the state legislatures. But apportion-
ment of the Senate by states means that district lines for the 
Senate are stable,71 while district lines in the House of Represen-
tatives shift as population shifts.72 Combined with the fact that 
senatorial tenure is more sure, if only by virtue of the longer 
term of office, the stability of senatorial "districts" may actually 
lead to easier identification of and with Senators than Represen-
tatives, and hence to more personally meaningful conversation. 
Democracy as meaningful conversation may thus suggest that 
despite its malapportionment, the Senate is the more 
"democratic" of the two houses of Congress. 
In democratic elections in some countries, particularly for 
the chief executive where that official is elected, there is an in-
sistence that the eventual winner be chosen by a numerical ma-
jority of those voting, so that a runoff is employed if there are 
more than two candidates and none obtains a majority in the 
first round.73 Since the ideology of American democracy associ-
70. Or, more precisely, never more populous. See note 45. 
71. The Constitution provides that "no new State shall be formed or erected within 
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or 
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States 
concerned as well as of the Congress." U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 3, cl. 1. 
72. This is due in part to the Supreme Court's decision in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1 (1964), applying the one person one vote rule to intrastate House districting. 
Subject to that constraint, the "shifting" of district lines can be done by state legislatures 
even when population has not shifted, but in practice the one usually follows the other. 
73. France provides the prime examples of such "two ballot" elections. The 
French president is chosen in the manner described in the text, while members of the 
French legislature, though chosen with "two ballots" if no candidate receives a majority 
in the first round, may still emerge with only a plurality, because more than two candi-
dates may make it into the second and final round. See Sartori, Comparath·e Constitu-
tional Engineering at 11-12 (cited in note 40). A variation on the two ballot theme (not 
including the majoritarian aspect) is found in election of the American President and 
Vice-President, with the second round conducted under special rules in the House of 
Representatives (or in the Senate, in the case of the Vice-President), if no candidate 
wins a majority of the electoral college in the "first round." U.S. Const., Amend. XII. 
Recourse to the House for election of the President has been required twice in Ameri-
can history, in the elections of 1800 and 1824. See Drinan, House of Representatives, 
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 252 (Supp. I, 1986). (In subsequent textual 
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ated with the vote-centered model attaches so much significance 
to majority rule in candidate elections, one might have expected 
to find such runoff elections the norm in the United States. In 
fact, except for the contorted procedures for presidential and 
vice-presidential selection, even the possibility of runoff elec-
tions is unusual at any level of American government. Instead a 
plurality usually suffices for election to public office, and this is 
perfectly satisfactory under democracy as meaningful conversa-
tion.74 Little is to be gained by additional election rounds, as a 
single round can serve perfectly well as stimulus to the ongoing 
democratic conversation. 
American history has seen the gradual extension of the 
electoral franchise, until it is now close to universally available 
in the adult population. The appeal of broad extension of the 
franchise is obvious under either the vote-centered or the con-
versational models. In conversational terms, personal meaning-
fulness of the conversation is the stabilizing force, and that 
meaningfulness is ultimately dependent upon the incentives of 
candidates to garner votes. The more broadly those incentives 
extend, the greater the stabilizing influence the conversation 
brings. 
That children are not accorded the vote is understandable 
in either vote-centered or conversational terms, because as a 
group they likely have insufficient maturity for either self-
governance or political conversation. But the conversational 
model also explains why their parents or guardians need not be 
accorded extra votes on account of their children, an omission 
that presents a real puzzle for the vote-centered model.75 As a 
stimulus to conversational involvement, the single vote accorded 
adults is entirely satisfactory. 
There has also been a gradual movement in the United 
States toward direct election of the most important public offi-
cials. In many democracies, some centrally important policy 
making officials are elected by bodies which are themselves 
elected. This is the way in which the chief executive- typically 
called a premier or prime minister-is chosen in most democra-
cies. In the United States, Senators were originally chosen by 
discussion of the electoral college, I will omit mention of the procedure for selecting the 
Vice-President.) 
74. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986). 
75. See note 45. 
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state legislatures,7~ and the President was chosen by an electoral 
college, the members of which were chosen as each state de-
cided, and hence did not even have to be popularly elected.77 In 
the case of the Senate, the states gradually introduced popular 
election on their own, and the Seventeenth Amendment now 
requires that Senators be chosen directly by the electorate.78 In 
the case of the President, the original electoral college scheme is 
still basically in place as a formal matter, but the states (working 
in conjunction with political parties) have all (more or less) ef-
fectively constrained their electoral college members to follow a 
popular presidential vote in the state.79 By making more clear-
to these public officials and to their constituencies-with whom 
the constituents are ultimately conversing, these changes likely 
foster more personally meaningful conversation. 
At the same time, there are surely limits to the conversa-
tional stamina of voters. Federal elected offices are few, but in 
some states the ballot contains a laundry list of candidates for a 
large number of state and local offices. In my home state of Illi-
nois (by no means extreme in this regard), in addition to the 
Governor and Lieutenant Governor, statewide elections are 
held for a Secretary of State, an Attorney General, a Comptrol-
ler, and a Treasurer,w in addition, of course, to members of the 
(bicameral) state legislature and a varying but often large num-
ber of local officials, including judges. Such a proliferation of 
elected offices does have the virtue in conversational terms of 
multiplying the possibilities for intensive engagement that 
comes from personal involvement of the candidate. But the du-
ties of many of these officials are decidedly peripheral to the 
concerns of very large numbers of voters, with the result that 
they are urged into conversations that hold little interest for 
them. This seems at least as likely to alienate as engage. In 
conversational terms it seems that the biggest conversational 
bang for the general election buck is obtained by election of a 
76. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. I. 
77. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ I, cl. 2. 
78. See Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 452, 467 
(1955). 
79. See generally William C. Kimberling, The Electoral College in I Essays in 
Elections I (National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, 1992); Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 Const. Comm. 201, 203-06 (1996). Most states 
award their entire electoral college delegations to the state's winner of a presidential 
popular vote, but Maine and Nebraska employ more complicated systems. See Kimber-
ling, supra, at 8. See also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
80. See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.§§ 5/2A-5-6 (Michie, 1996). 
516 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:481 
relatively small number of generalist public officials like legisla-
tors and chief executives. 
The conversational model comfortably accommodates- the 
sweeping protections afforded to speech and the press by the 
First Amendment, and particularly the emphases on '"the wid-
est possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources"' and on assuring "'unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringin~ about of political and social changes de-
sired by the people."' 1 This is not a particularly telling basis on 
which to favor the model over its vote-centered competitor, 
since the vote-centered model also accommodates open political 
communication.82 Still, free speech and press are "mere" means 
to the end of faithful decisionmaking under the vote-centered 
model, while the conversational model places them pretty close 
to the core of American democracy. In this sense, the conversa-
tional model may be more hospitable to the central role that the 
First Amendment protections of communication have come to 
play in contemporary constitutional law. In any event, neither 
model would seem to provide a compelling explanation of the 
substantial First Amendment protection that is in fact accorded 
in the United States to non-political communication.83 
More telling, perhaps, is that the conversational model is 
hospitable to the allocation of significant areas of public policy 
to officials who are neither elected nor directly answerable to 
those who are. This is a common and important feature of 
American (and other) democracies that seems anomalous from 
a vote-centered perspective, since it strains the connection be-
tween the members of the electorate and their re-presenters. In 
the United States, such allocation is found by degrees, reaching 
significant proportions with delegations to "independent" ad-
ministrative agencies, subject in practice to varying regimens of 
congressional and executive oversight or overruling. With the 
Federal Reserve Board in the United States, for example, there 
remains the possibility of control by elected officials, but that 
possibility is hemmed in by very substantial legal and conven-
tional restraints. 84 Policy-making by non-elected officials takes 
its most extreme form with the constitutional power of the fed-
81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam). 
82. See note 19 and accompanying text. 
83. See Stone et al., Constitutional Law at 1249-1322 (cited in note 25). 
84. See A Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency Auton-
omy, 96 Yale L.J. 787,810 n.146 (1987). 
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eral courts effectively to veto state and federal legislation upon a 
finding that it is unconstitutional. 
While the sounds of silence about such constitutional re-
view cannot compare with those about the Senate's apportion-
ment, public opinion polls suggest that policy-making by C<?urts 
is not particularly unsettling to the American body politic.8' At 
the same time, however, constitutional decisions with regard to 
particular matters can become quite controversial. These are 
typically matters like abortion, racial preferences, and rights of 
the terminally ill as to which strong and contradictory opinions 
are widespread in the electorate. 
The vote-centered model has little to offer in making sense 
of this complex of attitudes toward judicial review. Its account 
of the controversy that greets some court decisions relies on a 
"countermajoritarianism" of the courts that assumes a 
"majoritarianism" in the rest of the system that does not exist.&; 
And the model offers no explanation of the general receptivity 
to judicial review, which should be troublesome if vote-centered 
"self-government" is at stake. 
Judicial review by the light of the conversational model is a 
large subject that I cannot do justice to here, but it is at least 
clear that the conversational model provides a good deal more 
suitable framework than the vote-centered model for accommo-
dating the constitutional role of the courts, as well as other as-
signments of policy-making to unelected officials. Unlike the 
vote-centered model, democracy as meaningful conversation 
contains no suggestion that every member of the electorate need 
be involved with each item on the public agenda. What matters 
instead is that to one degree or another a sense of real involve-
ment with public matters be widely dispersed among the elec-
torate. Assignment of authority over areas of public policy to 
non-elected officials-even relatively irretrievable assignment as 
in the case of judicial review in the name of the Constitution-
does not necessarily interfere with such widely dispersed popu-
lar involvement. 
Nor is there anything particularly anomalous under the 
conversational model about the political controversy that occa-
sionally greets particular court decisions. The conversational 
model need not posit that topics of conversation are entirely 
85. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995 71, 73 (Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 1995). 
86. See Section IV, supra. 
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fungible for voters, that if they cannot be involved in conversa-
tion about abortion, the placement of a new schoolhouse will do 
instead. People do care deeply about particular public issues, 
and for those who care deeply a substitution of topics will not 
do. And while the courts are not entirely unconversational, 
theirs is not conventional conversation. They hear from liti-
gants, of course; and unlike legislatures, appellate courts feel an 
obligation to explain in detail and in writing the bases for their 
decisions. The "democratic" problem with the courts under the 
conversational model is that they insulate themselves from con-
versation with the broad range of people who may have a 
pressing interest in certain issues before them. 87 
The insulation is not solely the product of appointment 
rather than election of the judiciary. As every first year law stu-
dent learns, the courts necessarily perform two different func-
tions-adjudication of past disputes and policy formation (i.e. 
announcement of rules of law) for the future-that are in sub-
stantial tension with one another. While democratic conversa-
tion might be appropriate for the latter, it is decidedly ill-suited 
to the former. As a result, ongoing democratic conversation by 
judges is disapproved by professional norms of judicial con-
duct.RB For this reason it should not be surprising to find that 
constitutional judicial decisions on controversial issues breed a 
degree of resentment as "undemocratic" even in jurisdictions 
where judges are elected. 
IX 
Democracy as meaningful conversation can also shed light 
on less foundational features of American democracy. It sug-
gests, for instance, that, other things being equal, stability of 
electoral district lines is a good thing. 89 The conversational per-
spective simultaneously raises a cautionary flag about the cur-
rently popular proposals for legislative term limits,90 and about 
87. Cf. Robert H. Burt, The Constitution In Conflict (Belknap Press of Harvard U. 
Press, 1992). Dare I suggest that the "difficulty" with the courts as constitutional poli-
cymakers in a democracy might better be dubbed "counterconversational" than 
"countermajoritarian"? 
88. See Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990) ("A candi-
date for judicial office shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the 
court." (emphasis supplied)). 
89. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
90. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). 
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the substantial advantages that incumbents appear to have in 
electoral contests. Each in its own way may threaten the mean-
ingfulness of the democratic conversation, by dampening the in-
cumbent's incentive (and, in the case of the incumbent advan-
tage, that of challengers as well) to engage the electorate in that 
medium. Another problem -one to which the Supreme Court 
has been attentive-is that of obstacles placed in the way of 
ballot access for candidates.91 There are surely legitimate inter-
ests that are served by requiring some significant showing of po-
litical support for a candidate seeking a place on the ballot. But 
access that is too onerous is troublesome. If candidates who do 
have some significant following are excluded from the ballot, 
their followers may come to doubt that their concerns are taken 
seriously in the democratic conversation. 
The conversational model also brings into focus some of 
what is at stake in current debates (and litigation92 ) about ra-
cially gerrymandered legislative districts. From a vote-centered 
perspective, it might seem puzzling that members of racial mi-
norities seem to attach great importance to having members of 
their race as their representatives. As individual voters they 
have essentially no influence on eventual legislative outcomes, 
no matter who represents them. But even as groups, in vote-
centered terms members of racial minorities might be thought to 
combine their voting resources more effectively by having them 
spread out over several districts, rather than concentratin~ them 
in a few in a way that ensures election of one of their own. 3 The 
emphasis of the conversational perspective, on the other hand, is 
on conversational involvement rather than on legislative out-
comes. For members of the electorate able to experience it, the 
ability to identify with a representative may well cause the 
democratic conversation to be more personally meaningful. 
This provides a quite general argument for districting along lines 
of politically salient interests, but, given the history of race rela-
tions in the United States and the consequent destabilizing po-
tential of minority disenchantment, racial minority groups may 
be especially appro~riate candidates for such conversation-
enhancing districting. 4 
91. See Stone et al., Constitutional Law at 786-91 (cited in note 25). 
92. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush~-. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). 
93. See Charles Cameron, et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Sub-
stantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794 (1996). 
94. See Section XI. Needless to say, conversation enhancement through districting 
cannot be made broadly available, since the number of racial, religious, ethnic, occupa-
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Democracy as meaningful conversation can also help frame 
useful questions about campaign finance reform. Does com-
mercial dominance of the airwaves by one side in an electoral 
campaign seriously jeopardize the meaningfulness of the demo-
cratic conversation for those out of sympathy with the domi-
nating message? Or does the secondary conversation leave the 
overall effect robustly meaningful still? If campaign contribu-
tion limitations divert resources from primary to secondary 
democratic conversation, does that affect the overall meaning-
fulness of the conversation? And then, quite apart from fi-
nancing, does the drumbeat of short political advertisements 
around election time produce more meaningful conversation or 
more cynicism? 
These could easily be multiplied, but it is important to em-
phasize that even if these questions are answered in conversa-
tional terms, public policy conclusions do not necessarily follow. 
It is quite possible, for instance, that some phenomenon relevant 
to the meaningfulness of the democratic conversation also 
touches other significant aspects of the system. Some item of 
campaign finance reform, for instance, might simultaneously in-
crease the meaningfulness of the conversation but make it more 
difficult to attract honest or intelligent people into public office. 
In such a situation one might well conclude that the meaningful-
ness of the conversation was of secondary significance, either 
because the quality of public servants is itself stability enhanc-
ing, or because that quality is independently important. In 
similar fashion, the existing limit of two terms for the President 
might be thought desirable despite the anti-conversational in-
centives provided in the second term, because excessive presi-
dential power is more to be feared. But if the conversational 
model does not answer all or even any of the many pressing 
questions about American democracy, it certainly suggests dif-
ferent, and I hope fruitful, ways of framing a great many of 
those questions. 
tiona!, and other politically salient groupings far exceeds the three national legislators 
representing most members of the electorate, or even the larger number of public offi-
cials for whom the typical American citizen is eligible to vote. Indeed the Constitution 
forecloses such personal identification with members of the House of Representatives 
for voters under the age of twenty-five, and for recent citizens, because it makes mem-
bers of such groups ineligible to serve in the House. See also U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 
2. For the Senate the ineligible population is defined along similar but more restrictive 
lines. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 3. In addition to an even more restrictive age qualifica-
tion, no person is eligible to be president who is not a "natural born citizen." U.S. 
Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
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X 
Democracy as meaningful conversation can also provide in-
teresting insights on more general issues of democratic govern-
ance. It may, for instance, suggest that representative democ-
racy is more "democratic" than direct democracy. As we have 
seen, Madison thought that representative democracy was supe-
rior to direct democracy, because it would yield results "more 
consonant to the public good. "95 Others have defended repre-
sentative democracy as the only efficient way to conduct demo-
cratic government-conceived in vote-centered terms-on a 
large scale.96 But if meaningful democratic involvement is 
achieved more through conversation than through voting, we 
may well have a greater measure of such meaningful involve-
ment with the two-stage ongoing process of representative de-
mocracy than we ever might hope for with any but the most in-
timate examples of direct democracy. 
Even if large direct democratic gatherings needn't degener-
ate into "mobs,"97 the individual's vote in any such gathering 
would be very unlikely to affect any outcome, and the assembly 
as a whole would have to do its business in a short time frame 
and severely limit the items on its agenda, the number of speak-
ers, the length of speeches, and likely all three at once. In a di-
rect democracy of any size and degree of heterogeneity (to say 
nothing of a hypothetical gathering of an entire nation state), it 
would then be quite likely that no speaker would address any 
matters in a way congenial to significant segments of the elec-
torate. Most representative democracies, in contrast, limit the 
size of legislative chambers so that each member has a real 
chance of affecting outcomes.98 They employ full-time 
"professional" legislators meeting in extended sessions and 
dealing with an extensive public agenda. This combination 
vastly extends the potential for broad electoral involvement in 
conversation that can play a meaningful, even if indirect, role in 
the decisive legislative stage. 99 
95. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at R2 (cited in note 5). 
96. See remarks of "Philanthrop" and "Americanus Ill", in Debate cited in note 19. 
97. See note 44. 
98. The present 435 member House of Representatives may be testing the upper 
limits of the size of a legislative chamber where each member has a fa1r chance of having 
his vote affect ultimate dec1sions. 
99. Cf. Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment at 111 (cited in 
note 24). 
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Direct democracy might, of course, stimulate an extensive 
secondary conversation that could serve as a vehicle for conver-
sational engagement of the citizenry. And one could imagine 
that direct democracies might come to accommodate a larger 
agenda and more extended debate by scheduling frequent 
meetings and choosing those who speak because of their repre-
sentativeness of some electoral point of view. Any movement in 
this direction would, of course, be limited by the fact that the 
citizenry at large has other things to do. Putting that constraint 
to the side, such moves might cause some give and take to de-
velop between the representatives and their constituents. This 
might further stimulate a secondary conversation, and the net 
result could be a robust sense of engagement for members of the 
electorate. Direct democracy would then have become demo-
cratic in the spirit of the conversational model, but it would have 
done so by introducing elements of representative democracy 
that make it congenial to democratic conversation. 
The conversational model may also help resolve the demo-
cratic puzzle referred to in the public choice literature as the 
"paradox of voting." 100 The paradox is rooted in the "free rider 
problem" produced by the ineffectiveness of any individual's 
vote to determine the outcome of an election. Given this inef-
fectiveness, each voter, if he is assessing things "rationally," 
should conclude that he might as well stay home (or do some-
thing more worthwhile) on election day and leave the voting to 
("ride free" on the voting of) others. The paradoxical fact that 
people do vote in large numbers has led to contorted attempts to 
understand voting as having "consumption value" or 
"entertainment value" for the voter. 101 In this way of thinking 
about things, a voter votes not to affect the outcome of the elec-
tion, but because he derives pleasure or satisfaction from per-
forming his "civic duty" in participating in the selection of pub-
lic officials. 
Democracy as meaningful conversation helps to dissolve 
the paradox. If voting is not the quintessential act of self-
government, but rather a pivotal stimulus for, and a part of, an 
ongoing conversation-indeed one where the sense of personal 
meaningfulness is heightened by a connection between repre-
sentative and constituent-then it is more natural to think of in-
100. See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II ["Mueller If') 348-69 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1989). 
101. I d.; Mueller, Public Choice at 122 (cited in note 15). 
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dividuals as valuing voting as part of what gives meaning to a 
sustained activity that is a component of their everyday lives, of 
their senses of self. To be sure, the average individual's partici-
pation in democratic conversation will not likely be decisive in 
policy making. The chance of being conversationally influential 
on some discrete issue is perhaps greater for many individuals 
than the chance of determining the outcome of a candidate elec-
tion, since there are lots of such issues. But the personal mean-
ingfulness of the democratic conversation does not depend on 
discernible influence on ultimate decisions. And even beyond 
personal meaningfulness in the sense that I have been using the 
term, we do not actively engage in ordinary conversations-even 
those with an element of dispute-solely because we hope to 
persuade. And we do not passively observe discussions by oth-
ers solely because they will educate us better so that we can then 
take some concrete action on firmer ground. Rather both active 
and passive involvement in conversation give meaning to rela-
tionships to other individuals and more generally to the envi-
ronment in which we function. There seems every reason to 
think that the democratic conversation functions in much the 
same way. This is, I suppose, a "consumption value" account of 
why people vote (and could appropriately be called a response 
to "civic duty"), but it is an account that gains plausibility be-
cause it frees the act of voting from the ineffectual isolation into 
which it is cast by the vote-centered model. 
Democracy as meaningful conversation also can help us ap-
preciate why representative democracy seems to thrive on a 
large scale, such as that found in the United States and other 
populous democracies. At the time that the United States Con-
stitution was adopted, the Antifederalists argued that a legisla-
ture made up of a tiny proportion of the population, such as that 
which made sense for an extended republic, could not sensitively 
represent the interests of a large population. 102 From a vote-
centered perspective they certainly had a point, for voting, even 
when supplemented by open communication thereafter, cannot 
make the legislature into a mechanism for processing the senti-
ments of a large population. Indeed if the vote is taken as the 
mechanism of self-government, then, other things being equal, 
the degree of the individual's self-governing power necessarily 
102. In Volume I of The Debate on the Constitution, supra note 19, see, e.g., Centinel 
/,at 60; Letters from the "Federal Farmer" to "The Republican," at 269; "Brutus" Ill, at 
320,321, 323; Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph, at 467; Dissent of the 
Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, at 533. 
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diminishes as the size of the electorate grows, 103 approaching the 
vanishing point with an electorate of any substantial size. The 
democratic conversation, in contrast, has attributes of a "public 
good" in the economist's sense, where participation by one per-
son does not correspondingly diminish the capacity of others to 
participate-as long as it is appreciated that by far the largest 
portion of participation will be passive rather than active. 104 To 
the extent that the democratic conversation is the linchpin of the 
system, and participation in it by the electorate is largely pas-
sive, there is no obvious maximum size for districts in a stable 
democracy, nor for the democracy as a whole. 10; 
XI 
Our Madisonian constitutional system was designed in sig-
nificant part to deal with the politics of interests that we encoun-
tered in Section IV. Madison urged an extended republic en-
compassing all the states, for instance, as a corrective to what he 
called "factions," which he defined as "citizens ... united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, ad-
verse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and ag-
103. Operating from a vote-centered perspective, Robert Dahl seems to acknowl-
edge the point. Dahl, Critics (cited in note 20). He associates democracy with "one of 
the most fundamental of all freedoms, the freedom to participate in the making of the 
laws that will be binding on oneself and one's community." !d. at 78. But then, recog-
nizing that the degree of "participation" understood in vote-centered terms must dimin-
ish as the size of the electorate increases, he suggests that "the greater scale [found in 
representative democracies 1 probably stimulates a concern for rights as alternatives to 
participation in collective decisions." Jd. at 220. 
104. This point is basically missed in Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineer-
ing at 56 (cited in note 40). In discussing an alleged virtue of single member geographi-
cally based plurality systems as creating "a direct linkage between the elector and its 
elected representative," Sartori asks whether the linkage can be "meaningful" in popu-
lous districts, and says that those who vote for the loser "simply lose their vote ... [are 1 
not represented at all." !d. Once the possibility of passive but real participation in con-
versation is recognized, however, it is not clear that there need be a loss of "linkage" in 
large districts. Indeed since the largest part of the democratic conversation proceeds 
without the representative, deals with a multitude of different subjects, and contem-
plates eventual rather than immediate effect on the representative, see Section VII, it is 
not even clear that active participation by one member of the electorate does that much 
to crowd out acti~·e participation by others. 
105. This point should be qualified by the recognition that smaller districts may 
yield more engaging conversations, if the smaller size brings homogeneity along racial or 
other conversationally salient dimensions, which then allows more personally meaning-
ful involvement. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text. In that sense the Antifeder-
alist point retains some force. But large districts can be homogenous and small districts 
need not be. Without that homogeneity, the conversational advantages to smaller dis-
tricts seem likely to be modest. 
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gregate interests of the community." 106 "Extend the sphere [of 
the country]," Madison urged in Federalist 10, and: 
[y]ou take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you 
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if 
such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison 
with each other. 107 
Despite the Madisonian correctives, concern with a politics 
of interests has hardly abated. While Madison made no specific 
mention of the coalescence of factions into organized groups, 
the modern concern is more likely to be expressed in such terms. 
There is perhaps no more common lament from all sides of the 
political spectrum in the contemporary United States than that 
of the untoward operation of "interest groups," which are often 
referred to derisively as "special interests." There is even wide-
spread doubt that there is such a thing as the "permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community" or the "true interest 
of ... [the] country" 108 as opposed to some "equilibrium" in the 
bargaining process among organized groups. Indeed it is fair to 
say that an interest group "model" of democratic politics has 
gained substantial currency, in which democratic outcomes are 
seen as the result of bargaining among organized groups. In the 
most extreme versions of the model, it is such groups alone that 
play significant roles in the production of legislation or other 
important public policy choices. Legislators and other public of-
ficials are taken to act only as brokers among those groups, and 
unorganized members of the electorate are basically irrelevant 
in the production of democratic outcomes. 1()') 
As a way to characterize actual democratic outcomes, the 
interest group model probably has more plausibility than does 
the vote-centered model, with its insistent and unrealistic egali-
tarianism. Still, as might be expected with any simple model, the 
available empirical work suggests that there is a much richer set 
of inputs into democratic outcomes than those of organized in-
terest groups.110 Nor is this surprising from a theoretical per-
106. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at 78 (cited in note 5). 
107. Id. at 83. 
108. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
109. See Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics 35 (Cornell U. Press, 1952); 
Landes and Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. 
& Econ. 875,877 (1975). 
110. See Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 29-33 (cited in note 56). 
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spective. Even apart from the insulation from constituent pres-
sure that was Madison's aim, the interest of candidates and offi-
cials in election and reelection makes unlikely any exclusive 
concern on their part with constituents who have coalesced into 
organizations. There is no reason to think that issues that mat-
ter to voters either lead them to support organizations devoted 
to those issues or not to care much at all. In between those ex-
tremes is the likelihood that some sentiments of large numbers 
of voters will matter enough to affect voting behavior, though 
not enough to justify support of groups organized around those 
sentiments. To the extent that elected officials understand this, 
they will seek to attract that class of unorganized voters. Candi-
dates will remain disproportionately attentive to organized 
groups, both as sources of information and as efficient mobiliz-
ers of votes, but that does not suggest anything like ignoring the 
rest of us. 
Interest group theorists have not focused on issues of sta-
bility. An interest group model might suggest instability, for the 
outcomes it posits leave entirely unsatisfied those voters in be-
tween the extremes of organization and disinterest, those who 
seriously care about certain issues but not enough to support 
groups organized around those issues. But by hypothesis that 
middle group of voters is disorganized and hence is likely to be 
insufficiently powerful or insufficiently concerned to act on its 
dissatisfaction in destabilizing ways. The recurrent grousing that 
one hears about "special interests" might then under the interest 
group model represent a resultant low level of dissatisfaction. 
The concern with interest groups is readily understandable 
in normative vote-centered terms. Any disproportionate influ-
ence of organized groups necessarily compromises the vote-
centered equality of inputs. In these terms, however, ordinary 
politics is deficient as well.lJl Disproportionate interest in issues 
is pervasive and makes everyman's politics a politics of interest. 
There may well be problems in the outcomes of a politics of in-
terests- "rent seeking" legislation and the like, the societal costs 
of which exceed the benefits-and organized groups may pro-
duce more of such outcomes than ordinary voters. But the root 
of the problem is in differential interests, not in the fact that 
111. As Madison's Federalist 10 discussion, see notes 107-108 and accompanying 
text, seems implicitly to recognize, with its concern with common interests or passions, 
but with no mention of any special role of organizations in pursuing those interests or 
passions politically. See Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers (cited in note 5). 
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those interests find expression through organized groups. This 
makes any vote-centered descriptive account of the dissatisfac-
tion with interest groups in politics ring somewhat hollow, since 
there is little hint of such dissatisfaction with the politics of the 
unorganized. 
The conversational model provides a far more satisfactory 
explanation of the pattern of dissatisfaction. It is public deci-
sionmaking outside the conversational ambit that in conversa-
tional terms has the potential to be problematic. The clearest 
case of such decisionmaking that proceeds heedless of the 
democratic conversation is the proverbial "back-room deal," an 
understanding reached between interest groups and decision-
makers outside the public eye. What is problematic about inter-
est groups from the perspective of democracy as meaningful 
conversation is thus not some disproportion of influence on cer-
tain outcomes, but rather that organized groups have the capac-
ity denied to most of us to engage in such back-room deals-
leaving meaningless any public conversation about the subject 
matter of those deals. Even when the secret favors the interest 
groups receive take otherwise legitimate form, deal making out-
side the ambit of the democratic conversation thus drains de-
mocracy of what the conversational theory posits as the taproot 
of public support. Groups are, of course, no different in this re-
spect from individuals with the interest and the resources for 
private lobbying, but they are quite different from the interested 
but unorganized voter, for whom public conversation (including 
the vote) is the exclusive means of democratic participation. 
Conversely, within the conversational model, interest 
groups are essentially unproblematic when they engage in the 
democratic conversation. Indeed they may serve a salutary pur-
pose if they facilitate the public expression of the views of some 
voters. The disproportionate attention to what organized 
groups have to say may cause some concern when there are both 
organized and unorganized groupings of voters who care pas-
sionately about an issue. Still, within the conversational model 
this has no seriously dispiriting effect if the democratic conver-
sation nonetheless remains meaningful for the unorganized, if, 
that is, the unorganized view is given voice and the conversa-
tional stance of the interest groups and the public official is not 
taken to be a sham that masks a decisional process that is really 
proceeding in private and heedless of what is being said publicly. 
The possibility of a sham is, however, impossible to dispel, 
for organized groups have the capacity for back-room dealing, 
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even if in fact they operate completely in the open. Both groups 
and officials can lessen such concern by engaging in the demo-
cratic conversation. But the mere capacity of organized groups 
to operate outside the ambit of the conversation, combined with 
the difficulty of tracing the causation of democratic outcomes, 
probably condemns American democracy to chronic concern 
about the political operation of interest groups. 
There is a converse problem to the disproportionately large 
political influence of organized interest groups. This is the 
problem known to American constitutional law as that of 
"discrete and insular minorities." The idea is that some groups 
of voters (whether organized or not) are disdained by others and 
hence shut out of the political give and take. The phrase 
"discrete and insular" is not a particularly good choice, because 
widely dispersed groups may be even more politically ineffectual 
than insular ones. 112 In any event, in conversational terms the 
problem is the existence of voters for whom the democratic con-
versation has no personal meaningfulness, because it is clear to 
them that their conversational participation is not politically 
meaningful. 
It is probably inevitable that there will be categories of vot-
ers that are perennially excluded from the democratic conversa-
tion, and within bounds this is unavoidable and unproblematic. 
Any society will treat certain behavior and certain aspirations as 
beyond respectable bounds. This is true in the United States, 
for instance, of polygamists, of those who would employ minor 
children in hard labor, and, to cite a couple of recently promi-
nent examples, of Texas secessionists, and of those who practice 
female circumcision- to say nothing of the society's thieves and 
murderers. Even in such cases, arguments that the behavior 
should not be disdained will occasionally be heard and even 
heeded. There are few more reviled persons in the United States 
today than "drug dealers," but there is also a lively debate about 
whether and to what extent the sale of certain prohibited drugs 
should be legalized. In addition, members of such excluded 
groups may find conversational engagement on other matters. 
An advocate of polygamy may also be intensely interested in 
whether the city council subsidizes a new football stadium or 
logging is allowed in national forests. But even if some disfa-
vored persons find little in the way of conversational alterna-
112. See Robert W. Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Bene-
fits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 15 Nw. U. L. Rev. 978,996 (1981). 
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tives, social living dictates that certain matters remain more or 
less indefinitely outside legitimate conversational bounds. 
The more serious conversational problem- the one that 
takes on constitutional dimensions-arises when there are no 
plausibly acceptable grounds for conversational exclusion. Thus 
Black Americans were long notoriously excluded by both formal 
and informal means from most avenues of political participation 
in large parts of the country. Because of this history they are 
usually cited as the quintessential "discrete and insular minor-
ity." 
The problem of malapportioned state legislatures can be 
conceived in terms of the exclusion of some from the conversa-
tional give and take. Neither Madison nor the Constitution he 
did so much to craft addressed the interest group problem at the 
state (and local) level, where, as Madison put it, "the fewer 
probably will be the distinct parties and interests ... the more 
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression." 113 
The "oppression" he had in mind, of course, was political dis-
dain and exclusion of those who were opposed to the majority, 
and resultant disregard of their interests. It was Madison's cen-
tral argument for the new Constitution that in a large and het-
erogeneous country such factional oppression would be difficult. 
But on a state level he saw it as a problem of serious dimensions. 
If this Madisonian analysis of the state situation is accepted, it is 
also reasonable to conclude that the interest group problem at 
the state level was substantially exacerbated by malapportion-
ment of state legislatures prior to Reynolds. 114 
Prior to Reynolds, apportionment was strictly up to the 
state legislatures themselves, with the result that any dominant 
factions had substantial leeway to perpetuate that dominance. 
State legislatures were thus importantly different from and more 
troublesome than the Senate in both presenting more of a 
problem of interest group sway in the first place and in tending 
to entrench it. The result of such entrenchment, of course, 
would be effectively to exclude (or at least substantially disfa-
vor) others in the political give and take. By leaving the only ef-
fective mechanism for stirring the political pot under the control 
of those who had an interest in keeping its contents still, the 
113. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at 83 (cited in note 5). Justice 
~Calia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 116 Sup. Ct. 1620, 1634 {1996), graphically depicts in 
mterest group terms struggles at the state and local level in Colorado. 
114. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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malapportionment of state legislatures may thus have bred cyni-
cism about the meaningfulness of the democratic conversation 
not just for conventional discrete and insular minorities like 
Black Americans, but for even more substantial portions of the 
electorate in affected states. 
In this sense, requiring periodic reapportionment of state 
legislatures might have been a mechanism by which to unsettle 
factional tyrannies in the state context, and thereby to shore up 
the democratic conversation at that level. On these assumptions 
Reynolds may be seen as a mechanism for strengthening Ameri-
can democracy, albeit in a very different way than the Court 
claimed, or perhaps even realized. And if this is accepted, there 
is not much of a puzzle about the popular embrace of Reynolds, 
and its comfortable coexistence with a malapportioned Senate. 
For Reynolds may have required state legislatures to become 
more like the United States Senate in the conversation-
enhancing way that the conversational model takes as important 
to a stable democracy. 
XII 
There are plainly some phenomena of American democracy 
for which the vote-centered model provides a better account 
than does democracy as meaningful conversation. For one 
thing, consider the repeated depiction of the system as 
"majoritarian" and the fixation with what popular majorities 
think. I have treated these as aberrations and discounted them, 
but they are also phenomena which a model might seek to ex-
plain. 
Potentially there is a good deal more than the rhetoric of 
American democracy at stake. Consider a hypothetical tale. 
Under the convoluted procedure that the United States Consti-
tution establishes for selection of the President, if no person 
commands a majority in the electoral college, the House of Rep-
resentatives chooses among the three candidates with the largest 
number of electoral college votes. In that House election each 
state delegation has one vote. With the Perot candidacy in 1992 
there seemed for a time to be the possibility that no candidate 
would command a majority of the electoral college. Now sup-
pose that there had been an electoral college standoff, and that 
in the House the less populous states had joined together to 
produce a choice for President of the candidate who had come 
in (a distant) third in the popular vote. 
1997] DEMOCRACY AS CONVERSATION 531 
Such a turn of events is not particularly far-fetched. 115 I 
have little doubt that if it had transpired it would have presented 
the country with an important crisis, and possibly a seriously 
destabilizing one. If I am right in this speculation, it must be be-
cause selection of a President traceable to a relatively small 
popular minority runs against some part of the grain of Ameri-
can democracy. It is irrelevant to that part of the grain that the 
hypothesized turn of events would have been accompanied by 
the most searching and serious public conversation-as it almost 
surely would. Only history can account for how we got the con-
stitutional procedure for selection of the President, and only 
considerations outside the conversational model-
considerations such as the stabilizing force of egalitarianism and 
majoritarianism in the system-can account for the trouble into 
which that history just might have led us in 1992, and might lead 
us yet. 116 In this sense the electoral college route to selection of 
a President, which I have mentioned as evidence that our de-
mocracy is not so insistently majoritarian, also suggests that the 
system likely has important majoritarian strains. 
But if democracy as meaningful conversation paints only an 
incomplete picture of a complex system, it colors in a good deal 
more than its chief competition. Among the features of Ameri-
can democracy that the conversational model accounts for de-
cidedly better than the vote-centered model are bicameralism 
and satisfaction with the Senate; election of a President inde-
pendent of the legislative branch; the electoral treatment of 
children and their parents; the constitutional role of the Su-
preme Court, and its popular embrace; the comfortable use of 
single (or dual) member geographically defined legislative dis-
tricting; the plurality selection norm in legislative elections; the 
pervasive suspicion of the political activity of interest groups; 
and the appeal to minority group voters of districting likely to 
send members of their groups to serve in legislatures. 
115. After imagining the above I came across a variation on the drama in Lawrence 
D. Longley and Neil R. Peirce, The Electoral College Primer 1-15 (Yale U. Press, 1996) 
(chap. 1, titled "The 1996 Election is not Quite Decided: A Fantasy"). Chapter 3, enti-
tled "Recent Crisis Elections" documents the regularity with which we court trouble be-
cause of the electoral college scheme. !d. at 37-88. The authors quote former Senator 
Kefauver as saying, "Every four years the electoral college is a loaded pistol aimed at 
our system of government. Its continued existence is a game of Russian roulette. Once 
its antiquated procedures trigger a loaded cylinder, it may be too late for the needed 
corrections." !d. at 124. 
116. My own hunch is that the House would likely avoid such a move against the 
grain, but even if I am right that only serves to emphasize that the grain is there. 
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I do not, however, want to exaggerate the power of the con-
versational model. There is plenty of disengagement and cyni-
cism about government in the United States-with attendant 
implications for stability-despite the ubiquity of the democratic 
conversation. And there are undoubtedly explanations for the 
stability of American democracy that have little to do with con-
versation-or with vote-centeredness. The prosperity of the 
country would be high up on my list if I were asking what it is 
about American society rather than about American democracy 
that causes stability. (And the maldistribution of that prosperity 
would be high on my list of causes for concern about instability.) 
I am sensitive about the possibility that the conversational 
model may be uncritically rooted in American democracy. I 
have intentionally left a degree of ambiguity about whether the 
power of the model extends beyond the United States. On the 
one hand, I have identified certain features of American de-
mocracy that seem especially suited to conversational engage-
ment. In this connection, it is at least suggestive that democracy 
in the United States is the longest lived in the world despite the 
fact that it has ethnic, racial, and religious "cleavages" that, not 
surprisingly in the United States and elsewhere, have been asso-
ciated with instability.117 On the other hand, wide ranging public 
conversation about public policy is found in democracies beyond 
our borders, and may well have stabilizing effects in those con-
texts as well. It may just be that the United States is a basically 
conversational democracy (with elements of vote-centeredness), 
while some other democracies are basically vote-centered (with 
elements of conversationalism). 118 In this sense it might be ap-
propriate to think of democracy as meaningful conversation not 
so much as a model of democracy, but as an interpretation of the 
version found in the United States. 
All this suggests an agenda for comparative research. The 
constituent states in the United States vary in a number of ways 
that might be relevant to the nature and quality of the demo-
cratic conversation, like sizes (and, thanks to Nebraska, the 
117. See Robert A. Dahl, Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions 
from Democratic Experience, in Nomos XXXVIII at 175, 189 (cited in note 52). 
118. It is common currency among political scientists that political parties in the 
United States are "less disciplined ... than European-style parties." Norman Schofield, 
Rational Choice and Political Economy, in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice 
Controversy 189, 202 (Yale U. Press, 1996). The discipline referred to is faithfulness to 
party programs, and there should be some substantial tradeoff between party discipline 
and openness to meaningful public conversation. 
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number) of their legislative chambers, ratio of legislators to vot-
ers, use of term limits for legislators, regulation of campaign fi-
nances, the nature and extent of popular balloting on issues, and 
the number of public officials who must stand for election. Be-
cause the states are embedded in the United States there is no 
varying degree of stability with which these features might read-
ily be correlated. But it still might be possible to compare the 
different states along some measure of a popular sense of in-
volvement in the process of governing. 
Foreign democracies, of course, differ from those in the 
United States in quite fundamental ways. Those democracies 
characterized by proportional representation might be treated 
as vote-centered, with the United States as a conversational de-
mocracy. The two might then be compared for the nature and 
extent of a sense of popular involvement in governance and of 
stability.119 
While there could be some payoff in such comparative re-
search, the results are unlikely ever to instill the kind of confi-
dence that attends modeling in the natural sciences. There is 
simply no substitute for the controlled experimentation avail-
able in hard sciences. Nor will it necessarily do to wait. Models 
of democracy that we carry around in our heads affect actions 
that we take here and now. They affect, for instance, contempo-
rary debates in the United States about term limits, incumbency 
advantages, campaign finance, initiatives and referenda, the role 
of the courts in constitutional review, ballot access, ballot desig-
nation of candidates with multiple parties, 120 and lots of other is-
sues. As I have been at pains to say, I do not advance democ-
racy as meaningful conversation as resolving any such debates, 
but I do think it can clarify them, and that is a contribution not 
to be gainsaid, or even to await completion of an ambitious 
agenda of comparative empirical research. 
119. Compare G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, 
Stability, and Violence (Harvard U. Press, 19S2); Dahl, Thinking About Democratic 
Constitutions at 191 and n.32 (cited in note 52). 
120. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (I 997). 
